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CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE SOCIAL
INEQUALITY PARADOX
Yoav Dotan*
The recent landmark decision by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC opens the
way for new and more decisive regulation of the vast amounts of private and corporate
money poured into the political system. Howeve, the theoretical grounds for campaign
finance regulation-as reflected in the Court's opinion-remain highly perplexing. The
purpose of the current article is to tie together the evolving constitutional principle of
equality in election with modern process theory and to apply them to the field of cam-
paign finance. The inherent tension between the stringent requirement for political
equality on the one hand and the reality of market inequalities on the other is a central
characteristic of liberal democracy. I argue that this tension can best be explained and
resolved by the idea ofdemocratic partnership. That is, by the idea that while in lib-
eral democracy the existence of economic inequality is justfied on grounds of efficiency,
such justification holds only if economic inequalities are subject to the continuing possi-
bility of correction through redistribution of wealth, which should take place as part of
the political process under conditions of equality. This analysis reveals that there is a
certain paradox in the current campaign finance doctrine. While, according to the
fundamental principles of liberal democracy market inequalities should be corrected
through the functioning of the political distributive process-under conditions of equal-
ity--according to the current doctrine of the Supreme Court, these same market
inequalities are allowed to interfere and distort this very process of correction. I call this
paradox the social inequality paradox. Because it is the role of the judiciary in lib-
eral democracy to ensure the viability and competitiveness of the democratic process, I
argue that it is also the role of the courts to intervene and resolve the social inequality
paradox in the field of campaign finance.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE OF EQUALITY IN
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC'
reveals a significant shift in campaign finance doctrine. In
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Visiting Pro-
fessor of Law (2003-2004), Fordham Law School. An earlier version of this article was
presented at Faculty Seminars in Seton Hall Law School and in Fordham Law School. I am
grateful to Richard Briffault, Hanoch Dagan, Ariela Dubler, Kyle Duncan, Marty Edelman,
Deborah Goldberg, Kent Greenawalt, Menachem Hofnung, Sam Issacharoff, Gillian
Metzger, Gerry Neuman, Peter Strauss, and John Witt for their valuable comments on the
draft and to Tom Paskowitz for his excellent research assistance.
1. 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
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McConnell the Court seems much more willing than before to en-
able Congress to combat the malignant influence of wealth on the
integrity of American democracy.2 The landmark decision by the
Court opens the way for new and more decisive regulation of the
vast amounts of private and corporate money poured into the po-
litical system, but leaves no illusion regarding the hurdles which
must be surmounted on the way to a more democratic system of
campaign finance.'
While the Court's decision in McConnell seems to mark a new
stage of a more rigorous regulation of campaign finance, the theo-
retical bases and the ideological rationales of the Supreme Court's
approach remain perplexing. The Court founded its approach for
the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation solely on what
it saw as the compelling interest in preventing electoral corrup-
tion.4 It avoided comprehensive discussion of the constitutional
interests that underlie campaign finance regulations as well as
questions related to the role of the judiciary in that regard. Most
importantly, the McConnell Court evaded any discussion of what
place the fundamental value of political equality has in campaign
finance doctrine.
The subject of this Article is the place of equality in campaign
finance law and the role of the judiciary within the constitutional
framework in defending political equality. The paramount impor-
tance of the idea of political equality with regard to campaign
finance has been stressed by judges, legal scholars, and some of the
most prominent political philosophers of our generation.5 The Su-
preme Court, however, has yet to come to terms with the question
of the place of equality in campaign finance law.6
This Article contends that the tendency of campaign finance
doctrine to overlook the importance of equality seems to contrast
sharply with developments in other areas of constitutional law, and
most notably with recent developments in the case law and consti-
tutional scholarship. There are two major developments in the
field of election law that support the restoration of the place of
equality in campaign finance doctrine. The first is the develop-
ment of a strong version of the requirement for political equality in
2. See infra text accompanying note 40.
3. See McConnel4 124 S. Ct. at 706 ("We abide by... Congress' most recent effort to
confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth on our political system. We are under no illusion
.... Money, like water will always find an outlet.").
4. See infra text accompanying note 46.
5. Notably byJohn Rawls and Ronald Dworkin; see sources cited infra note 24.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 20 and 46-52.
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the last three decades, manifested by the phrase "one person, one
vote" and applied in the Court's decisions on poll taxes, property
limitation, and apportionment schemes.7 The Court's "reappor-
tionment revolution" was followed by important developments in
the theory of the judiciary's role in ensuring the integrity of the
democratic process. In particular, I refer to the development of the
"process theory" ofjudicial review and its recent applications in the
field of election law.8
While these two developments invigorated major reforms in
both the practice and theory of election law, they have failed to
similarly change the campaign finance field. Attempts by the pro-
ponents of campaign finance reform to apply the equality
principle to the campaign finance field have foundered because
money contributed or spent in elections is considered speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment." The attempts to apply modern
process theory to the field of campaign finance fared no better.
Process theory has focused on the relationship between various
political factions within the democratic process. Any attempt to
apply it to relationships between groups or members of society with
different economic statuses requires a theoretical analysis of the
relationship between economics and politics is lacking in the exist-
ing literature. °
The purpose of the current Article is to tie together the evolving
electoral equality principle and modern process theory and apply
them to the field of campaign finance. This Article accomplishes
that by presenting a certain view of the social regime of our liberal
democracy and by discussing the relationship between two funda-
mental concepts of current social structure: political equality and
economic inequality." Rather than founding the analysis on the
7. See infra text accompanying notes 78 and 122.
8. See infra text accompanying note 121.
9. See infra Part V.B.
10. Accordingly, those who tried straightforwardly to apply process-based arguments to
the campaign finance field, such as by arguing that the poor should be viewed as a "discrete"
or "insular" minority, faced serious objections both with regard to the power of this argu-
ment on its merits and with regard to the validity of process-based arguments in
constitutional theory in general. See infra Part IV.C and notes 144 and 149.
11. For other works discussing campaign finance in the context of the tension between
political equality and economic disparity, seeJamin Raskin &John Bonifaz, The Constitutional
Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REa. 1160,
1161-62 (1994) (arguing that "recurring political impulse toward campaign finance reform
in the twentieth century reflects a basic tension between a private market economy and a
modern democratic polity"); Cass Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1413 (1994) ("The special problem with [current campaign finance
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question of whether (campaign) money is "speech," this Article
discusses the place of money (and other economic possessions)
within the constitutional framework and its relationship to the po-
litical process. Rather than arguing for the application of the
principle of political equality ("one person one vote") to campaign
finance, it discusses the relationship between political equality and
economic inequality in liberal democracy and its implications for
campaign finance law. Rather than arguing that the poor are an
"insular" minority,12 This Article examines the role of the judiciary
in regulating the relationship between the poor and the rich under
the basic principles of liberal democracy.
My argument centers on the moral justification for the funda-
mental principles of the current social order: while in liberal
democracy, the existence of economic inequality is justified on
grounds of efficiency, this holds only if economic inequalities are
subject to the continuing possibility of correction through redistri-
bution of wealth, which can take place as part of the political
process only under conditions of electoral equality. I call this justi-
fication the argument for democratic partnership. It follows that
because the political process is designed to correct socio-economic
inequalities, it cannot be controlled by the very inequalities it is
designed to correct. Otherwise, a paradox forms, in which the
channels of political change are essentially blocked. I call it the
social inequality paradox. It supplies a justification for intensive in-
volvement of the judicial branch in monitoring campaign finance
laws under process-based theory.
In Part II, this Article will provide a short review of the current
law, with emphasis on recent developments in the status of equality
in campaign finance law. Part III presents the Article's main thesis
regarding the relationship between markets and politics in liberal
democracy. The normative argument for democratic partnership will
be supplemented by a short historical account of the development
of two constitutional doctrines by the Supreme Court during the
20th century: the expansion of suffrage and the acknowledgement
of the constitutionality of redistribution of wealth. The combina-
doctrine] is that it permits economic inequalities to be translated into political inequali-
ties."); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REv.
893, 899-900 (1998) ("The danger is that some of the rich will try to stretch their economic
advantage into the political sphere.");John S. Shockley, Money in Politics: Judicial Roadblocks to
Campaign Finance Reform, 10 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 679, 692-93 (suggesting that the rationale
of Buckley v. Valeo is to defend property rights of the rich against the possibility of redistribu-
tion by the majoritarian political process).
12. See supra note 10.
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tion of these two doctrines, this Article contends, supports democ-
ratic partnership as a theory that can justify current constitutional
doctrine. I shall conclude this part by presenting the social inequal-
ity paradox. The paradox is that, while according to the
fundamental principles of liberal democracy market inequalities
should be corrected through the function of the political distribu-
tive process-under conditions of equality-according to the
current doctrine of the Supreme Court, these market inequalities
are allowed to interfere and distort this very process of correction.
Part IV will argue that contrary to some suggestions in the litera-
ture, one of the primary functions of the judiciary is to closely
scrutinize the field of campaign finance. 3 This function is closely
related to the general role of courts to ensure the viability and sta-
bility of the democratic framework of the political process, and to
see that the channels for political change are kept open. More spe-
cifically, it is the duty of the courts to intervene to resolve the social
inequality paradox in the field of campaign finance.
Part V will deal with three possible objections to this Article. The
first relates to the argument that we should view the relationship
between the haves and the have-nots'4 in liberal democracy as yet
another case of interaction between two interest groups that com-
pete for influence on the democratic agenda. The second refers to
the relationship between campaign money and First Amendment
speech. My main point in response will be that the arguments for
judicial scrutiny supply sufficient justifications for the regulation of
campaign finance, even if it is regarded as political speech. The
third and last objection deals with the relationship between the
regulation of campaign finance in the name of equality and the
regulation of other forms of political influence. This Article will
refute that objection by pointing to the distinct nature of campaign
finance and the power of the justifications for its regulation.
13. Many proponents of campaign finance reform, faced with the constraints intro-
duced by current doctrine on campaign finance regulation (see Part II infra), adopt a slim
theory with regard to the role of the judiciary in campaign finance. See sources cited infra
note 115 and accompanying text.
14. I borrow the terms used by Marc Galanter in his celebrated article, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW AND Soc'v REv. 95 (1974)
(arguing that the wealthy are likely to do better than the poor in court litigation). I will
hereinafter use the terms "haves" and "rich," as well as "have-nots" and "poor," inter-
changeably. Accurate definitions of the term "poor" or "have-nots" are not needed for the
argument that will be presented here. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
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II. CURRENT CAMPAIGN FINANCE DOCTRINE
A. The Origins of the Campaign Finance Debate:
The Buckley Framework
The terrain of campaign finance was long shaped by the well-
known Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo.'5 In Buckley, the
Supreme Court dealt with a comprehensive campaign finance
scheme adopted by Congress in the wake of the Watergate scan-
dal. 16 Congress sought to impose far-reaching limitations on the
amount of money that could be given (contribution limits) and
spent (expenditure limits) in political campaigns. While ruling that
money spent in a political campaign should be regarded as
"speech," the Supreme Court upheld the contribution limits, but
not the expenditure limits, against a First Amendment challenge.
7
The Court reasoned that contributions implied only a limited
speech interest because they merely facilitated the speech of oth-
ers, and that the government's interest in preventing "corruption"
or the appearance of corruption justified limits aimed at prevent-
ing any single donor from gaining disproportionate influence
relative to others.' 8 On the issue of campaign expenditures, how-
ever, the Court reasoned that money spent by candidates
themselves, or by others outside of the candidate's formal cam-
paign, amounts more directly to speech and is less likely to exact a
quid pro quo. Therefore, expenditure limits were unconstitutional
because they could not be justified by the anti-corruption rationale
or by any other First Amendment rationale.'9
Most importantly for the current analysis, the Buckley Court deci-
sively rejected the argument that expenditure limits could be
justified on the grounds that campaign finance legislation should
equalize the relative power of persons other than money donors,
stating that "the concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. 2 °
15. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
16. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2000) [hereinafter FECA].
17. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12-59.
18. See id. at 25-27 (discussing the danger that unlimited contributions to candidates
would be made in expectation of quid pro quo). Similar interests justified mandatory public
disclosure of political contributions above minimal amounts. Id. at 60-84.
19. See id. at 45-48.
20. See id. at 48-49. The Court, however, held that expenditure limits could serve as a
condition for the receipt of public funding for one's campaign. Id. at 57 n.65.
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Buckley had a profound influence on the practices of campaign
finance. The distinction made by the Court between contributions
and expenditures was the major reason for the proliferation of Po-
litical Action Committees.2' The narrow definition the Court
provided for electoral speech contributed to the growing use of
"issue advocacy,"22 and to the sharp rise in private money dona-
tions, mostly in the form of "soft money," by wealthy individuals
23
and corporations. Consequently, the decision drew an almost
21. See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance: The Parties and the Court: A Comment on Colo-
rado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 91, 98-99 (1997)
(describing the consequences of Buckley's distinction between contributions and expendi-
tures with regard to money transferred to political organizations).
22. Issue advocacy is political speech that may mention specific candidates or political
parties but does not "expressly advocate" the election or defeat of a clearly identified federal
candidate through the use of words such as "vote for," "oppose," "support," and the like.
Under Buckley, such communications are exempt from the disclosure requirements of FECA
as well as from the ban on corporate and union contributions and expenditures. For a dis-
cussion of the influence of Buckley on the development of practices of issue advocacy, see
Frank Sorauf, What Buckley Wrought, in IF Buckley FELL 11, 19-23 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed.,
1999) [hereinafter IF Buckley FELL] (describing three main stages in the development of
PAC activity after Buckley). See also Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elec-
tion/Politics, 77 TIx. L. REV., 1751, 1751-54 (1999) [hereinafter Briffault, Issue Advocacy]
(describing the practices of issue advocacy). The practice of issue advocacy is closely related
to the term "soft money," which refers to indirect political contributions made on behalf of
political parties, corporations, unions, special interest groups and individuals. See Richard
Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 563, 564 (1999) [herein-
after Briffault, Public Funding] (describing the loopholes in the regulatory system of political
finance prior to BCRA).
23. For a description of the phenomenum of "soft money," see McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at
60-67 (describing the sharp rise of soft money after Buckley). See also, e.g., PHILIP M. STERN,
STILL THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN Buy 7 (1992) (indicating that Buckley's ban on com-
pulsory ceilings for campaign spending made even "safe" candidates ever fearful of being
outspent, and thus significantly contributed to the obsession of politicians with money);
Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620
(2000) [hereinafter Briffault, Parties] (noting that campaign finance innovations by the
large parties enabled donors to avoid FECA's contribution caps as well as other limitations in
the ban on the use of corporate and union treasury funds in federal elections, thereby ren-
dering the whole regulatory regime of campaign finance largely ineffective); IF Buckley FELL,
supra note 22, at 11, 12-19 (describing three main stages in the development of PAC activity
after Buckley); Burt Neuborne, Is Money Different, 77 TEXAS L. REv. 1609, 1617 (1998-99)
(arguing that rather than protecting individual autonomy, Buckley "condemns [candidates]
to a cyclical prisoners' dilemma, where each candidate must continue to raise and spend
more money in order to prevent others from obtaining an advantage"). For a description of
the influence that Buckley had on various political campaigns, see KATHELEEN H. JAMIESON,
DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION AND DEMOCRACY 16-23 (1992) and Roland S.
Homet, Jr, Fact Finding in First Amendment Litigation: The Case of Campaign Finance Reform, 21
OKLA. CITY. U.L. REv. 97, 110-11 (1996).
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unprecedented volume of criticism by legislators, scholars, and
• • 24
practitioners.
The apparent failure of Buckley's doctrines to supply a workable
framework for campaign finance law did not escape the attention
of the Supreme Court.2 While the Court did not overtly reverse any
of Buckley's foundations, during the last decade most Justices ex-
24. See, e.g.,JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 359-63 (1993) (referring to Buckley as
"profoundly dismaying" for ignoring the requirement of fair value to political liberties);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 94-101 (1993) (de-
nouncing Buckley's "money as speech" formulation); Frank Askin, Political Money and the
Freedom of Speech, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1065 (1998) (arguing that the Buckley regime enables
large contributors to effectively distort the democratic process); Edwin C. Baker, Campaign
Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that Buckley ig-
nored the special nature of political speech during election); Burt Neuborne, Buckley's
Analytical Flaws, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 111 (1997) (arguing that Buckley is analytically unsound);
Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 11, at 1165 (criticizing Buckley for its deviation from the fun-
damental principle of democratic equality); Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is
Money Speech., 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976) (arguing that Buckley repudiates fundamental values
of American self-government); Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19 (arguing that Buckley stands in contrast to fundamental values of
self-government). For a critique of the Court's claim that money spent in political cam-
paigns should be regarded as "speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment, see, for
example, Burt Neuborne, Soft Landings, in IF Buckley FELL, supra note 22, at 169, 172-77
(arguing that expenditure caps pose no threat to free speech principles); Skelly Wright,
Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality? 82
COLUM. L. REV. 609, 631-42 (1982) [hereinafter Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics]
(arguing that none of the rationales underlying the First Amendment's concept of speech
are served by the Buckley reasoning). For a critique of the Court's refusal to acknowledge the
relevancy of equality with regard to campaign finance, see, for example, Jamin Raskin &
John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 273, 277
(1993) (concerning what will happen "[w]hen the logic of the market-everything is for sale
and the highest bidder wins--overrides the political principle of one person/one vote
....."); Frank Sorauf, Politics, Experience and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1349-51 (1994) (criticizing the failure of the Court to
include the interest of Congress in sustaining representative and popular democracy within
its "corruption" analysis).
25. For a critique stressing the apparent incoherence of the distinction between cam-
paign contributions and expenditures in the context of campaign financing, see, for
example, Daniel D. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, SuP. CT. L.
REv. (1976) 1, 22-23 (pointing to the fact that the harmful impact of campaign expenditure
on the integrity of the political system does not differ from that of contributions); Sunstein,
supra note 11, at 1395 ("The post-Buckley cases reveal that there are enormous complexities
in holding the line between regulation of contributions and regulation of expenditures.");
Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the Flawed Postulates of Campaign Finance Reform, 3 U. PA.
CONST. L. 783, 785, 795-98 ("To the extent that one chooses to classify the expenditure of
money as a form of protected expression at all, contributions to political campaigns at best
represent only a marginally protected form of expression.); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Introduc-
tion, in IF Buckley Fell supra note 22, at I (describing the distinction as "schizophrenic"). See
also Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the End of the
Buckley Era? 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1738 (2001) (pointing to the fact that Buckely's distinc-
tion between express advocacy and issue advocacy has failed to work in practice).
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26pressed growing dissatisfaction with its central components. In
particular, various members of the Court openly questioned the
ability of the distinction between campaign contributions and ex-
penditures to cope with the complex realities of campaign finance
and called for its replacement. 27 The Court also developed a dis-
tinct jurisprudence with regard to the involvement of business
corporations in political elections, under which legislators enjoy
considerable latitude to regulate both campaign contributions and
expenditures by corporations.28 Last, and most important for the
purposes of the current analysis, the Court-even before its recent
decision in McConnell (see infra) -significantly expanded the
26. Six out of the nine justices of the Supreme Court recently demonstrated a willing-
ness to reverse Buckley. See generally Briffault, supra note 25, at 1758 (indicating that "[f ] or the
moment, Buckley survives because of the division within the Court over how to replace it").
27. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 408 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that the Buckley distinction between contributions and expenditures has
failed and that generally "Buckley has not worked"); id. at 41 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing the distinction and stating that "[w] hat remains of Buckley fails to provide an adequate
justification for limiting individual contributions to political candidates"); Briffault, supra
note 25, at 1759-69 (reviewing the concerns Buckley's doctrines raise in the real world).
Accordingly, in some decisions preceding McConnell the Court sustained limitations on
campaign expenditures spent by both political parties and business corporations on behalf
of candidates in federal elections. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Commm., 533
U.S. 431 (2001) (sustaining regulations of a political party's coordinated expenditures); FEC
v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of limits
on the ability of corporations to solicit funds for a political action committee); FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257-58 (1986) (reaffirming the constitutionality of limi-
tations on business corporate independent expenditure, while striking down expenditure
limitations on non-profit corporate organizations); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting corporations
from using treasury funds for independent expenditure in support of or in opposition to
candidates in elections for state office).
28. See references supra note 27. In Austin, the Court acknowledged that, in principle,
"expressive rights are implicated" with regard to business corporate speech, 494 U.S. at 655,
but indicated that "the resources in the treasury of a business corporation ... are not an
indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the
economically motivated decisions of investors and customers." Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986)). Correspondingly, the burdens of
proof with regard to the corruptive influence of campaign contributions by corporations are
minimal and stand in contrast to the usual allocation of burdens under the First Amend-
ment. See Briffault, supra note 25, at 1750. It is important to note that it was the business
nature of the corporation in Austin, rather than its corporate form, that triggered the differ-
ent treatment by the Court. The Court was careful to indicate that non-profit corporations
formed to express political ideas that do not engage in business activities should be treated
like any other participant in the political process (with regard to campaign finance doc-
trine). See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 264 (distinguishing between
business and political activities while pointing to the connection between the latter and
popular support); Austin, 494 U.S. at 662-63 (stressing the differences between non-profit
and business corporations).
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narrow "quid pro quo" conception of corruption it had espoused.
It identified "the corrosive and distorting effects of aggregation of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form
... as a "different type of corruption"30 justifying campaign fi-
nance regulation." Some members of the Court went even further
and openly challenged Buckley's rejection of voters' equality as a
rationale justifying campaign finance regulation.32
B. The Current Developments: BCRA and McConnell
The mounting pressure on Buckley's doctrines, and the growing
dissatisfaction with them serve as a background for the legislative
reform of campaign finance. After many failed attempts to initiate
campaign finance reform, Congress finally passed the Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Act of 2002 (BCRA) . The new Act addresses a
broad range of campaign finance issues, 4 but the heart of it con-
sists of new and more restrictive regulations of the two phenomena
that have dominated the campaign finance debate for more than a
29. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
30. Id.
31. This extended definition served the Court as a basis for its decision to sustain state
prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds to make independent expenditures in
support of, or in opposition to, candidates in elections for state office. See Austin, 494 U.S. at
660. In another recent decision the court identified corruption to include any form of sys-
tematic influence on the political process. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
528 U.S. at 389 (referring to "the broader threat from politicians to comply with the wishes
of large contributors"); See also Briffault, supra note 25, at 1749.
32. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. at 401-02 (Breyer & Gins-
burg J., concurring) (referring to Buckley's above quoted statement, supra note 20, "those
words cannot be taken literally. The constitution often permits restrictions on speech of
some in order to prevent a few from drowning out the many...").
33. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. no.
107-155, 116 Star. 81 (2002) [hereinafter BCRA]. For the history of the initiatives for cam-
paign finance reform, see, for example, David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of
Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL. REV. 236, 253-57 (1991);Jack B. Sarno, A
Natural Law Defense of Buckley v. Valeo, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2693, 2717-18 (1998) (describ-
ing the many failures of the reformers to pass the McCain-Feingold Bill in the 105th
Congress); Samuel M. Walker, Campaign Finance Reform in the 105th Congress: The Failure to
Address Self-Financed Candidates, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 181, 187-196 (1998) (describing the
failure of the initiative in the 105th Congress).
34. Among these issues are contributions by foreign nationals, BCRA § 303, donations
to the presidential inauguration committee, BCRA § 308, electronic filing and internet ac-
cess to campaign disclosure reports, BCRA § 501, and penalties for the violation of federal
campaign finance restrictions, BCRA § 312.
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decade: soft money and issue advocacy.35 BCRA bans the national
committees and political parties from using soft money (either by
directing, receiving, or spending) with regard to federal elections,
and significantly limits soft money activities of state and local po-
litical parties.36 Most importantly, BCRA expands FECA's disclosure
requirement to apply to a newly defined category of "electioneer-
ing communication" and extends the existing federal proscriptions
on corporate and labor union contributions and expenditures in
federal elections to include such "electioneering communica-
tions." 7 Thus, the new Act confirms and reinstates the tendency
reflected in recent decisions of the Court to expand the limitations
381
on campaign finance activities of business corporations.
Soon after its passage, the constitutionality of BCRA was chal-
lenged before the Supreme Court.3 9 In McConnell v. EC 4° the
Supreme Court upheld virtually all the major parts of BCRA, nota-
bly those parts of BCRA curtailing the soft money activities of
political parties and the extended proscriptions on corporate and
labor union contributions and expenditures in federal elections.
In addition, the five-Justice majority found no difficulty in sustain-
ing the BCRA ban on "coordinated expenditures": money
35. BCRA §§ 102 (2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1)); 201 (2 U.S.C. § 434); 203 (2 U.S.C. 441b(2)-
441c), § 204 (2 U.S.C. § 441b).
36. BCRA § 101(a) (2 U.S.C. §§ 4411(a),(d),(e)) (currently the new FECA § 323(a)
and § 323(e) respectively).
37. BCRA § 201 (a) (2 U.S.C. § 434(f)) (amending FECA § 304); BCRA § 203 (2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(2)441c) (amending FECA § 316(b)(2)). Thus, BCRA expands the range of elec-
toral speech for the purposes of campaign finance regulations. Id. Cf Buckley, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (defining electoral speech narrowly). This new definition of "electioneering com-
munication" in BCRA § 201 (a) is relevant to the limits on corporate and union spending
and to the new disclosure requirements. BCRA § 201(a) (defining electioneering communi-
cation as a broadcast, cable or satellite communication which (I) refers to a clearly
identified candidate for federal office; (II) is made within sixty days before a general, spe-
cial, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or (III) thirty days before a
primary election). See also Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance After the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARiZ. ST. L. J. 1179, 1200-01 (2002) (discussing the implications of the
definition).
38. See supra text accompanying note 27.
39. Section 403 of BCRA provides special rules for actions challenging the constitu-
tionality of any of the Act's provisions. BCRA § 403. The section provides for any challenger
to file an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia and for a hearing before a
special three-judge court. Id. It also directs the District Court to advance any such case on
the docket and to expedite its disposition. Id. Further, Section 403.provides for a direct ap-
peal process to the Supreme Court. Id. The special three-judge court in McConnell held some
parts of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld others. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d
176 (2003).
40. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176.
41. Id. at 172 et seq.
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contributed or expended in relation to "electioneering
communications" coordinated by a candidate or political party in a
federal election. 2 The Court abandoned some major distinctions
presented in Buckley that had controlled the campaign finance doc-
trine since 1976, including the distinction between "express
advocacy" and "issue advocacy"43 and between campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures.44
The Court's opinion in McConnell demonstrated the determina-
tion of the Court to correct Buckley's flaws. It also revealed
willingness on behalf of the Court to allow Congress much latitude
in its efforts to ensure the integrity of the electoral system in the
campaign finance field in the future. A more difficult question is
to what extent McConnell reveals a shift in the ideological under-
pinnings of the doctrine. The rhetoric of the Court's opinion
seems faithful to Buckley's framework. Campaign dollars are still
treated as First Amendment speech, and the sole rationale for
regulating campaign finance activities remains the interest in pre-
venting "corruption." The other major rationale for regulating
campaign finance, the interest in fostering political equality, is
completely overlooked by the Court.4 6 A closer look at the way the
Court applied these principles, however, reveals a significant ideo-
logical shift in the Court's approach. This shift is demonstrated in
the Court's treatment of the two fundamental components of Buck-
ley: the meaning of "corruption" and the status of campaign dollars
as "speech."
1. The Meaning of "Corruption" and its Relation to Political Equal-
ity-Even before McConnell, the Supreme Court had significantly
42. BCRA § 202 (amending FECA § 315(a) (7) (C)); id. at 195-96. Thus, the Court also
upheld the wide definition of "electioneering communications" of BCRA § 201 which aimed
to replace the narrowing construction of FECA disclosure provisions adopted by the Court
in Buckley. See 424 U.S. at 173 and supra notes 22 and 37.
43. 424 U.S. at 179-80 ("Nor are we persuaded, independent of our precedents, that
the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue
advocacy.") Cf supra note 22 and accompanying text.
44. While the majority opinion did not openly abandon the distinction between con-
tributions and expenditures, its wide interpretation to the term "contributions" seems to
mark the end of this distinction as presented in Buckley. See McConnell, 251 F.Supp. 2d at 196
("Buckley's narrow interpretation of the term "expenditure" was not a constitutional limita-
tion on Congress's power to regulate federal elections."); see also id. at 402-03 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("The majority's classification [of BCRA Title I's spending limits] ... exchanges
Buckley's substance for a formalistic caricature of it.").
45. See infra text accompanying note 53.
46. The word "equality" is not even mentioned throughout the 233 pages of the
Court's opinion, Compare the statement by the concurrence in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov-
emnment PAC, supra note 32.
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extended the meaning of "corruption" as a justification of cam-
paign finance regulation beyond the quid pro quo meaning
presented in Buckley.47 The McConnell Court, however, extended the
meaning of corruption to include not only "undue influence [of
money] on officeholder judgment, 48 but also many other appear-
ances of "big money" in politics. Thus, the Court indicated that the
very existence of significant donations creates likelihood that candi-
dates "would feel grateful for such donations," and this, in itself is
part of the meaning of corruption (or the appearance of corrup-
tion) which may justify regulation. 49 To this "political debt"
rationale the Court added the statement-based on the evidence
in the record-that campaign dollars are usually aimed at "secur-
ing access" to officeholders, and that "selling access" (by soliciting,
accepting, or using such dollars) creates an inherent danger of cor-
ruption or, at the very least, the appearance of corruption. 50 Even
more striking in this respect are the examples from the record that
the Court refers to as appearances of corruption, including dona-
tions from the tobacco industry (to scuttle tobacco legislation) and
"contributions from trial lawyers to Democrats [to] stop tort re-
form."5 ' Thus, the Court reads corruption to include the use of
economic power to shape public policies over by financially sup-
porting the campaigns of sympathetic candidates. If it is legitimate
for campaign finance regulation to foster such objectives under the
guise of the "corruption" rationale, the Court is close to acknowl-
edging the constitutionality of "restrict[ing] the speech of some
elements... in order to enhance the relative voice of others ... "
the very equality rationale flatly rejected in Buckley. 52
47. See infra text accompanying note 31. The Court has never actually defined what it
means by "corruption or the appearance of corruption." See Briffault, supra note 25, at 1741.
48. McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 664 (citing FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)).
49. Id. at 661 ("It is not only possible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for
such donations and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.").
50. Id. at 663 ("For their part, lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals alike all have
candidly admitted donating substantial sums of soft money to national committees not on
ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence over federal offi-
cials."); Id. at 666 ("Implicit (and as the record shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of
access is the suggestion that money buys influence.").
51. Id. at 664 (referring to testimonies included in the record of the District Court).
52. Cf at 748 (Kennedy J., dissenting) ("Democracy is premised on responsiveness.
Quid pro quo corruption has been, until now, the only agreed upon conduct that represents
the bad form of responsiveness .... "). It is worth noting thatJustice Stevens, one of the two
authors of McConnell, has consistently objected to the fundamentals of Buckley. See, e.g., Nixon
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that
"money is property, it is not speech"); Fed. Election Commn v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action
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2. Is Money Speech after McConnell?--At first glance the McConnell
decision seems to adhere to the general framework of Buckley:
since campaign finance activities are speech, any regulation of
campaign finance is subject to "strict scrutiny" by the judiciary. s A
closer look at McConnell reveals that the Court departed from this
framework in some very important ways. First, and most impor-
tantly, while the Court rhetorically adheres to the judicial review
standard of "strict scrutiny," it defers greatly to Congressional
judgment regarding the existence of corruption due to campaign
finance activities. Secondly, the willingness of the Court to sustain
far-reaching regulations on campaign expenditures, rather than
only on contributions, combined with the broadened definition of
corruption and the tendency to defer to Congressional judgment
regarding the existence of corruption, significantly lowers the
status of campaign dollars as protected speech. The bottom line of
McConnell is that while campaign finance is still discussed within
the framework of the First Amendment, 55 the degree to which the
Constitution protects it is open to question.
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Two other members of the
majority have recently expressed disagreement with Buckley's rejection of equality as ajustifi-
able rationale for such regulations. See supra note 32, For a discussion of the relationship
between the two rationales of corruption and equality, see David A. Strauss, Corruption,
Equality and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. Rv. 1369, 1370 (1994) (arguing that
corruption is a derivative problem and its meaning depends on one's conception of political
equality).
53. 124 U.S. at 86-87 (referring to Buckley as the point of origin for the constitutional
analysis). See also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., id. at 674 ("Like the rest of Title I, § 323(b) [of BCRA] is premised on
Congress's judgment that if a large donation is capable of putting a federal candidate in
debt to the contributor, it poses a threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption.");
id. at 680 ("We will not disturb Congress's reasonable decision to close that loophole [of
making or directing donations to organizations qualifying under § 501 (c)]."). Compare the
criticism of this trend by the dissenters: "Today's holding continues a disturbing trend: the
steady decrease in the level of scrutiny applied to restriction on core political speech." Id. at
734 (Thomas, J., dissenting); See also id. at 742-43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the
shift in the Court's standard of review regarding campaign finance speech).
55. In at least one place, the Court seems to differentiate between the campaign
money and the message that the money is aimed to foster, indicating that limitations on the
financial activity related to speech do not necessarily suppress the message itself. See id. at
658 ("The fact that party committees and federal candidates and officeholders must now ask
only for limited dollar amounts ... in no way alters or impairs the political message 'inter-
twined' with the solicitation."). This line of thinking was attacked by the dissent as violating
the First Amendment imperatives and deviating from Buckley. See Id. at 722 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("Our traditional view was correct, and today's cavalier attitude toward regulating
the financing of speech... frustrates the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment.").
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The recent decision of the Supreme Court in McConnell opens
the door for reconsideration of some of the fundamental assump-
tions of current campaign finance doctrine. In particular, the time
is ripe to reexamine the place of political equality in campaign fi-
nance law. The purpose of the current Article is to support the
ongoing movement to restore equality as a justification for cam-
paign finance regulation. This Article supplies a theoretical
argument explaining and establishing the centrality of political
equality in campaign finance. It provides a theoretical framework
that will enable both courts and legislators to expand equality
based regulation of campaign finance beyond the bounds of BCRA
and McConnell.
56
III. THE SEPARATION OF POLITICS AND MARKETS
IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
A. Markets and Politics in Liberal Democracy
The United States is a liberal democracy. For the purpose of the
current analysis I define "liberal democracy" as a socio-political sys-
tem which has a strong requirement for political equality among its
members but lacks a similar requirement for economic equality. 7
56. BCRA fails to address some of the fundamental obstacles to establishing a system
that will enable candidates to mount effective competitive races with minimal influence
from wealthy private donors. In particular, BCRA weakened the presidential public funding
program, since it increased the limits on the amounts that private individuals can donate to
candidates ("hard money") but did not increase the amount of private donations eligible for
public matching funds. Thus, the Act made private funding a much more attractive alterna-
tive to a public grant than it was before BCRA. See Briffault, supra note 37, at 1214-15
(discussing the influence of BCRA on public funding). See also note 182 infra and accompa-
nying text.
57. This is a minimal definition of the term. It does not purport to capture or reflect
the various possible social, political, and economic institutions that exist in liberal democ-
racy. However, this definition suffices for the current analysis since it reflects certain basic
characteristics of liberal democracy, the existence of which is manifested in many countries
around the globe, and points to those elements of liberal democracy that are most directly
related to the present discussion. The term liberal democracy carries more than one mean-
ing since both the term "liberalism" (or "liberal") and the term "democracy" are subject to
different uses, and different political theories are in disagreement regarding their content.
In the United States, liberalism is often identified as an inclination towards egalitarianism in
regard to distributive questions and the support of a strong and pervasive role of govern-
ment in society. In this usage, liberal politics are contrasted with "conservative" politics. See,
e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985) 181-85 (discussing the popular
contrast between liberalism and conservatism). I use the term "liberal" in its more classic
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The claim that campaign finance should be discussed as reflect-
ing the inherent tensions between economic disparity and political
equality has been widely acknowledged. 5 Hence, the definition of
liberal democracy presented above may be regarded by some as
trivial. It is, however, central to my analysis, and must be examined
carefully. For the purpose of discussing of the essence of liberal
democracy, let us consider the two following propositions:
Proposition 1
A has two votes for Congress;
B has only one vote for Congress.
Proposition 2
A drives to work in (her own) Jag;
B rides the bus.
Each of these propositions reflects some kind of inequality in
the division (i.e., the situation of holdings) of social goods59 be-
tween A and B. Yet our attitudes toward them are completely
different. As liberal democrats we wholeheartedly and uncondi-
tionally reject the inequality reflected by the first proposition, but
not the inequality reflected by the second. At the beginning of the
21st century, I doubt that there are many committed to democracy
that would even try to defend the first proposition of inequality.6 °
sense, emphasizing the centrality of individual liberties and economic freedom. The term
"democracy" is used in its general sense, meaning government by the people through repre-
sentatives, although in Madisonian terms this could be regarded as "Republicanism." SeeTHE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
58. See supra note 11.
59. I use the term "social goods" to include goods that are related to civil liberties and
social opportunities as well as economic goods (income and wealth). SeeJOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971) (presenting two principles ofjustice according to which all "pri-
mary" social goods should be distributed under the Rawlsian political theory).
60. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Is Moneyv Different , 77 TEX. L. REv. 1609 (1999) ("As a mat-
ter of political rhetoric, virtually no one openly argues that rich people should have more
political power merely because they have more money."). While the existence of the re-
quirement for political equality in liberal democracy is beyond dispute, its fulfillment may
be subject to various complexities. This is in particularly the case in large representative
democracies with a federative structure. Thus, in the United States, it may be argued that
the relative political power of voters to the Senate in small, low-populated states is greater
relatively to voters in large, highly populated states. It should be noted, however, that the
creation of this structure (in the course of the Great Compromise of 1787) reflected a desire
to equalize political power between voters in states of varying sizes and populations. See
ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 78-83 (1994)
(discussing the historical background of the Great Compromise). In other words, while such
a voting system deviates from the notion of simplistic equality, see infra note 65, it reflects a
certain conception of political equality rather than an abdication of the idea.
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This is because in any liberal democracy (as loosely and minimally
as it may be defined) there exists a strong normative requirement for
equality in the division of social goods, as long as these goods are
regarded as political in nature.6
On the other hand, the inequality in the possessions of A and B
reflected by the second proposition raises no such objections. In
our society, means of transportation (Jags, bikes, buses, and the
like) are considered as ordinary economic goods. Contrary to the
division of votes for Congress, there is no fundamental ideological
requirement that they be equally divided among all members of
the social framework. Indeed, some people may believe that if A
owns ajag then B should also be entitled to own one (or at least to
own a Ford), while others may strongly reject any such claim. But,
in any case, none of these various claims refer to the fundamental
ideological structure of liberal democracy. Rather, they reflect dif-
ferent ideological positions (of political parties, and so on) that
compete with each other within such a framework. In other words,
while the requirement for political equality is a constitutive com-
ponent of liberal democracy, it is precisely the lack of such
equivalent requirement in the economic sphere that is the other
constitutive component of the liberal democratic regime. 2 In
short, if you are willing to tolerate the type of inequality in proposi-
tion 1-then you are not a democrat (at least not as the term is
understood in our time, see below); if you are not willing to toler-
ate the type of inequality in proposition 2-then you are not a
liberal. 3
61. See infra text accompanying note 70.
62. Note that the lack of a requirement for full equality in the economic field does not
mean that there may not be any other claims in regard to social gaps in liberal democracy.
In particular, there may be a requirement for some social minimum in regard to economic
goods (such as housing, transportation, etc.) that would be considered as constitutive to the
ideological framework of liberal democracy. E.g., Jeremy Waldron, John Rawls and the Social
Minimum, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 250 (1993) (discussing the
question of social minimum in Rawls' Theory). There may also be requirements concerning
the maximum scope of the social differences. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 59, at 65-75 (pre-
senting "The Difference Principle," according to which economic inequality is justified only
in so far as it promotes the interests of the least advantaged members of society). Whether
or not this is the case is beyond the scope of the current discussion since the requirements
are very different from the requirement of full equality. See also Frank 1. Michelman, Forward:
On Protecting the Poor Through the First Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 9 (1969) (stressing the
problematic nature of the move to correct economic inequality through constitutional
measures in a society that "continues to be individualistic, competitive and market ori-
ented").
63. The economy is an essential element in liberalism, and markets inherently create
economic gaps. See,e.g.,JOHN GRAy, LIBERALISM 61 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that "[a]ccording
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Before continuing the discussion, there is much clarification
needed with regard to the terms I have used in the above para-
graphs. First, I used the term "equality" with regard to the
ideological requirement in liberal democracy for the division of
political goods. The notion of equality is, of course, extremely
64complex. I need not ponder it at length here for the following
reasons. First, the current essay concerns elections, where the re-
quirement for political equality is clear and pressing, often
reduced to the maxim "one person, one vote. ,65 Even if the mean-
ing of political equality is complicated with regard to other
political social goods, the simplistic version should suffice in the
current discussion.6 Secondly, what is important to my point here
to all classical thinkers liberty implies endorsement of the institutions of private property
and free market"). Some liberal theorists contend that liberalism should be understood to
require full equality also in the economic field, but maintain that economic differences
entailed by market activity do not infringe on the principle of liberal equality. See DWORKIN,
supra note 57, at 206 (suggesting that as long as economic disparities reflect different life
choices of persons and their relative contribution to the resources of the community, they
are compatible with liberal equality). This line of thinking acknowledges, in essence, the
dissimilarity between the division of goods in the political field and in the economic realm,
but includes both within the conception of "liberal equality." See WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEM-
PORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 87 (1990) (indicating that Dworkin has not changed the
basic premises of "the civilization of productivity" that is the core of traditional liberalism).
Therefore, it can be regarded to be within the general framework of liberal democratic
theory. For an additional view of the question of distribution in the liberal state, see, for
example, BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 168-80 (1980) (propos-
ing that each-member of society should have an initial equal share of economic resources
followed by a system of free exchange).
64. For a general discussion of the meaning of the term "equality," see, for example,
Ronald Dworkin, Equality of Welfare, in SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY 11 (2000) (distinguishing between equality of welfare and equality of resources);
DOUGLAS RAE, EQUALITIES (1981) (discussing the different meanings of equality); CHARLES
R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1989) (discussing the
subject matter, scope, and different applications of political equality); JACK LIVELY, DEMOC-
RACY 16-17 (1975) (distinguishing between political equality in regard to who has a right to
vote and equality in regard to voting procedures).
65. This conception of political equality is sometimes referred to as "simple individual
regarding equality." See RAE supra note 64, at 21; see also BEITZ supra note 64, at 4 (referring
to the "simple view" of political equality as the requirement that democratic institutions
should provide citizens with equal procedural opportunities to influence political decisions,
i.e., with equal political power over outcomes). For alternative interpretations of the concep-
tion of procedural democracy, see Ronald Dworkin, Political Equality, in SOVEREIGN VIRTUE,
supra note 64, at 185-86 (distinguishing between a "dependent" conception of procedural
democracy which assumes that it is most likely to produce beneficial substantive decisions
and results, and a "detached" conception that concentrates exclusively on the procedural
aspects of procedural democracy).
66. For definition of political equality, see, for example, ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985) (referring to the fundamentals of "democratic process" as
including equal votes, effective participation, enlightened understanding of voters choices,
final control of agenda by the demos, and universal suffrage). Even the seemingly simple
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is not to offer any specific conception of the term "political equal-
ity" but rather to stress that-whatever the preferred conception of
this term-it is radically different from what we regard as the
proper norms for the division of economic goods. The notion I
stress here is the gap between the norms for political and eco-
nomic goods in liberal democracy. Suffice to say that our
commitments to the principle of equality (whatever their particular
meaning) in these fields are radically different.
Secondly, I also need to explain the distinction between "politi-
cal" and "economic" goods. Political goods are the goods related to
political expression, to the free exercise of religion, to criminal-
process rights, and others commonly associated with fundamental
political liberties.6s The norms applied to these social goods are
requirement for "one person, one vote" means more than just assuring that each voter has a
right to vote. It requires that each voter has an equally weighted vote and thus an equal
opportunity to affect the outcome of an election. See Briffault, Public Funding, supra note 22,
at 573 (discussing the meaning of voter equality). The complexity of the requirement for
"one person, one vote" is reflected in reapportionment cases. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down Alabama apportionment as violation of the Equal Protection
Clause); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (invalidating a Georgia county unit system that
enhanced the voting strength of typical rural voters relative to urban voters). The complex-
ity is also reflected in questions regarding requirements of supermajorities in legislation or
in referendums. See, e.g., Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (affirming West Virginia's re-
quirements that political subdivisions of the state not incur bonded indebtedness or
increase tax rates without approval of 60% of the voters in a referendum election); see gener-
ally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, ET. AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: THE LEGAL STRUCTURE AND
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 171-85 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the application of the principle of
"one person one vote" and deviations from it); see also infra note 104 and accompanying text.
67. For arguments regarding the just division of economic goods in a liberal democ-
racy, see, for example, RAWLS, supra note 59, at 61 (introducing "the difference principle,"
according to which disparities in wealth and income are justified only to the extent that they
work to everyone's advantage); Ronald Dworkin, Equality of Resources, in SOVEREIGN VIRTUE
at 65 (introducing the metaphor of an auction to present a system of just division of re-
sources); WALDRON, supra note 62, at 250-52 (discussing the possibility of a fixed social
minimum, based on basic human needs, that suffices to answer the requirement of social
justice in liberal democracy).
68. See Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 1 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1982). (referring to "basic liberties" as including the
right to vote and to hold public office; liberty of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience
and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal)
property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the
rule of law). See also ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF
(1975) (discussing the "domain of rights" as including a "vast number of entitlements and
privileges [that] are distributed universally and equally and free of charge to all adult citi-
zens of the United States"). The fact that each citizen in a liberal democracy has an equal
right to vote and participate in the political process does not necessarily entail that each
citizen has the equal ability to carry out such rights. See, e.g., id. at 7 ("Surely, voters do not
have equal ability, equal information or education, or an equal stake in political decisions.").
See also John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED
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subject to the stringent requirement of equality, which does not
apply to other social goods regarded as belonging to the economic
sphere. In other words, one of the fundamental elements of liberal
democracy is the existence of a line of separation between those two
social fields (which is demonstrated by the two separate proposi-
tions presented above). The exact "location" of this line is not
always clear, and may be subject to variations in different societies,
as well as to ideological disagreement. For example, in some liberal
democracies health care and education are primarily considered as
belonging primarily to the political realm (and thus subject to the
regime of equality) while in others these goods are regarded as a
commercial commodity, subject to regulation by market forces and
thus not subject to the norm of equality.69 It will suffice, for the
purpose of the current analysis, to point to the very existence of
this line of separation, and to suggest that the social goods related
to democratic elections-the subject of the current discussion-
clearly rest within the political sphere. To sum up this point: the
line of separation between markets and politics in liberal democra-
cies is always there; it is a constitutive element of the notion of
liberal democracy even if the borders between the two realms
along this line are sometimes unclear, blurred, or contested.
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 105, 143 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995) ("[E]qual basic
liberties are the same for each citizen ... [b]ut the worth, or usefulness of liberty is not the
same for everyone."). Nor is there any assurance that disparities in wealth and income will
not influence the ability of different citizens to carry out their rights. Nevertheless, at least in
the field of the electoral process, the requirement for equality in basic political rights goes
beyond the mere existence of formal rights for each and every citizen. It is designed to en-
sure that every citizen has at least an equal practical opportunity to affect the outcome of
elections. See generally supra note 66; see also Rawls, supra, at 144-45 (discussing the "fair-
value" of political liberties, which means that each citizen has a "roughly equal" access to the
political system).
69. In some liberal democracies, such as Japan and Canada, there is universal access,
provided by the state, to comprehensive, low-cost medical care, while in others, such as the
United States, medical care is regarded as a market commodity and its supply is largely con-
trolled by the market. SeeJoan Babiak, Health-Care Access for the Elderly of Industrialized Nations:
Fallen and Can't Get Up? 4 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 221, 229-49 (1997) (reviewing the fun-
damental arrangements of health care in four different countries). The social approach to
the nature of given goods or services is also susceptible to change over time. Thus, for ex-
ample, in the United Kingdom, prior to World War II, access to medical services was secured
only for those who could pay for it, but after the war the government established the Na-
tional Health Service (NHS) in order to enable free access to health care to all UK residents.
During the Nineties, the Thatcher administration initiated a series of reforms in the NHS in
order to transfer the NHS into a market driven system. See Michael Calnan, The NHS and
Private Health Care, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 3 (2000) (describing recent developments in the
NHS following its privatization during the Nineties); JOHN MOHAN, A NATIONAL HEALTH
SERVICE? 44-72 (1995) (discussing the relationship between the ideology of the conservative




A third clarification needed concerns my claim that in liberal
democracy there exists a requirement for equality with regard to so-
cial goods that are political in nature. The existence of such a
moral requirement does not mean that this requirement is always
satisfied in reality. For example, social goods related to the legal
process, and the criminal process in particular, are subject to a
strict requirement of equality. In many liberal democracies, how-
ever, some goods related to the criminal process (notably the
services of defense lawyers) are predominantly regulated by the
market. This reality, however, does not change our moral position
regarding their nature. As liberal democrats we regard the situa-
tion where A has better chances than B to be acquitted in a
criminal trial just because she is able to hire better lawyers as mor-
ally illegitimate, even if for various practical reasons, we put up
with it. Our attitude towards inequality in this field is very different
from our attitude towards inequality regarding regular economic
goods, even if in practice market forces currently control both
fields.7
70. Since Aristotle, philosophers have grappled with different conceptions of the rule
of law. It is hardly contested, however, that the requirement that the law be applied even-
handedly to all is an essential element of any conception of this doctrine. See, e.g., F.A.
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 209, 212 (1960) (discussing the requirement of
equality of the law as a central requirement of the doctrine of rule of law); Joseph Raz, The
Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3, 7-11 (Robert L. Cunningham
ed., 1979) (asserting that laws are valid when they conform to the following principles: they
are "prospective, open, and clear," "relatively stable," general, applied by an independent
judiciary that is easily accessible, and not perverted by too much prosecutorial or law en-
forcement discretion).
71. In fact, the reaction of the legal system itself (particularly the courts) to the exis-
tence of inequality regarding legal services in criminal trials ranges from attempts to turn a
blind eye (by using legal fictions such as the fiction that the quality of legal representation
does not influence the outcome in litigation), through open critique of this reality, to the
creation of legal rights and social institutions to minimize it. See, for example, the statement
of the Court in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1956):
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old prob-
lem. People have never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. This
hope at least in part, brought about in 1215 the royal concessions of the Magna Carta
... These pledges were unquestionably steps toward a fairer and more nearly equal
application of criminal justice. In this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties of
due process and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which al-
low no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of persons.
Id. See also Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in the result) (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983))("[T] he harsh reality
[is] that the quality of a criminal defendant's representation frequently may turn on his
ability to retain the best counsel money can buy."). See also, e.g., Symposium on Indigent
SUMMER 2004]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 37:4
B. A Short Historical Account: The Expansion of Suffrage
and the Constitutionality of Redistribution
The foregoing discussion of the nature of liberal democracy
should be complemented by two historical notes. First, while the
strong requirement of political equality (manifested by the "one
person, one vote" desideratum) is a commonplace for liberal de-
mocrats of our time, it was not generally accepted by prior
generations. In the European democracies of the 18th century the
right to vote was limited to members of privileged groups.12 Nor
was universal suffrage practiced in the British Colonies before or
immediately after the American Revolution.73 Laws and other vehi-
cles for excluding disadvantaged groups, such as African-
Americans and women, from eligibility to vote were commonplace
during the 19th century.
7 4
Most importantly, until recently, practices excluding voters on
the basis of property ownership were also part of the American po-
litical system. Soon after the Revolution, all States adopted
legislation that required either taxpaying qualifications or other
Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. TEx. L. Rav. 979, 983 (2001) ("While our Constitution re-
quires that all defendants receive equal treatment under the law, it is very unevenly applied
throughout the country. The Department of Justice is committed to the concept that a lack
of resources should never affect access to a quality legal defense."). See also William H.
Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1714 (1993) ("The greater abil-
ity of the rich to escape conviction for their crimes is morally comparable to their greater
ability to commit them in the first place.").
72. See CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY To DEMOCRACY
1760-1860 5-9 (1960) (describing the limitations of suffrage to freeholders of 40 shillings
that was in force in England since 1430 and until after the American revolution); R.C. VAN
CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120, 121,
125 (1995) (pointing to the limited franchise in England during the 17th and 18th centu-
ries).
73. For a description of the limitations on suffrage in the British Colonies during the
eighteenth century, see WILLIAMSON, supra note 72, at 12-13 (describing various property
limitations in the different colonies). During the revolution several states enacted laws that
disenfranchised loyalists and any other persons who refused to take loyalty oaths. See also id.
at 118-20 (describing the practices in various states). Similarly, most states adopted property
requirements after the revolution. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
74. On the formal level, the possibility of exclusion on the basis of race and color was
ended in 1870 (by the acceptance of the 15th Amendment) and the possibility of a legal
barrier to female participation was ended in 1920 (by the 19th Amendment). In reality,
however, practices of exclusion, particularly of black voters in Southern states, continued
into the twentieth century, and were flagrant until the passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965. See, e.g., ISSACHAROFF, KARLEN & PILDES, supra note 66, at 90 ("[B]y the first decade of
the twentieth century, virtually all black voters had been eliminated from the polls across the
South through a combination of force and the imposition of restrictive (and often fraudu-
lently administrated) voting qualifications.").
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property-related proof as a requisite for the eligibility to vote.75 The
view that only those who owned property or paid taxes were eligi-
ble to vote was based on a number of related grounds. The
opponents of universal suffrage argued that paupers had limited
personal capacities, demonstrated by their failure to acquire prop-
erty. They argued that the poor are uneducated and hence unfit to
participate in politics. 6 They also argued that the poor lacked a
sufficient stake in the political process because of they lacked re-
sources and could not pay substantial taxes." Finally, it was feared
that indigent people-because of their indigence-were too de-
pendent on others, and therefore lacked the ability to act as free
agents in the political realm.
It was only in the late 1960s that the Supreme Court began to
strike down taxpayer requisites and other legal practices aimed at
excluding the poor from general suffrage. 8 It seems that the
75. SeeJacob Katz Cogan, Note, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and Suffrage in Nine-
teenth-Century America, 107 YALE L. J. 473, 483 (1997) (reviewing taxpaying qualifications in
the various states); Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41
STAN L. REv. 335, 335-36 (1989) (noting that during the nineteenth century 14 states
amended their constitutions to exclude paupers generally or inmates of poorhouses from
suffrage); Ortiz, supra note 11, at 906 (explaining that the purpose of such qualifications was
to ensure voters' stake in the political process).
76. See Steinfeld, supra note 75, at 338 (explaining that according to the view of those
opposing general suffrage, "the propertyless should never exercise political authority pre-
cisely because they were not free and independent agents"); see also id. at 340 (the poor were
not considered to be "their own men" and therefore lacked political capacity). The motives
of the opponents of general suffrage were, on occasion, less directed against the poor and
more the result of assumptions that the abolition of the property qualification would enable
non-whites (and in particular blacks) to participate. See WILLiAMSON supra note 72, at 142
(discussing the rejection of Michael Taney's bill for general suffrage in Maryland's Senate in
1797).
77. See Ortiz supra note 11, at 906 n.44 (reviewing various practices of exclusion of the
poor and other groups from suffrage); Shockley, supra note 11, at 694 (arguing that the idea
that the rich have more stake in the political system rests behind Buckley).
78. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 215 (1970) (invalidating a
property qualification for voting in a bond election); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S.
701, 702 (1969) (holding that the property ownership requirement for voting violated the
Equal Protection Clause); Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating a
New York law making the right to vote contingent on owning or leasing taxable realty in the
district); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that "voter
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax").
In the aftermath of the reapportionment revolution the principle of "one person, one vote"
applies to elections at all levels (with some rare exceptions). See New York City Bd. of Esti-
mates v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 692-93 (1989) ("The equal protection guarantee of 'one-
person, one-vote' extends not only to congressional districting plans, not only to state legis-
lative districting, but also to local government apportionment. Both state and local elections
are subject to the general rule of population equality between electoral districts." (citations
omitted).
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distorted practice of exclusion of the have-nots from the general
suffrage has become a thing of the past.79
The second historical development of importance to our discus-
sion deals with the constitutionality of property redistribution
through the political process. s The point of origin of the American
constitutional system has been that there are strict constitutional
limitations on the power of the government to infringe on private
property for redistributive purposes. A notable manifestation of
this position is Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull,s1 according
to which a law that "takes prperty from A and gives it to B" would
exceed the proper authority of government. The roots of this
strict position are related to the central importance of property
rights in American thinking as well as in the traditional suspicion
towards any kind of governmental intervention in private rights.
3
Its underlying premises were that the only legitimate goal of gov-
ernment in general, and of the police force in particular, was to
79. See Neuborne, supra note 60, at 1616 ("American democracy, responding to the
ethos of an egalitarian age, has abandoned almost all formal wealth qualifications for voting
and running for office."); Frank I. Michelman, Property vs. Distribution in the Constitutional
Idea of Property, 72 IowA L. REV. 1319, 1330 (1987) ("The Constitution today contains a de-
mocratic principle of political equality that will not countenance the republican
exclusionary strategy of demanding private material competence as a condition of fran-
chised citizenship."); Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1277, 1299-1302 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court developed a conception
of political equality that negates the possibility of excluding citizens because of lack of
wealth). See also cases cited supra note 78.
80. By "redistribution" I mean any governmental action that takes wealth from some to
give to others. Taxation is a common case of redistribution, and is redistributive whenever
the benefits received do not equal taxes paid. But redistribution is done also by social bene-
fits legislation, takings, and so forth. SeeJeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64
S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1434-35 n.102 (1991) (defining redistribution); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal
Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L.
REv. 413, 471-2 (1996) (discussing the meaning of redistributive taxation).
81. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
82. Id. at 388. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 561 (2d ed.
1988) (analyzing the meaning of the Calder formula); see also Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E.
431 (N.Y. 1911) (striking down New York's Workingmen's Compensation Law on similar
grounds);JOHN WITr, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC Ch. 6 (2003) (describing the fate of work-
ingmen's compensation legislation in New York during the Lochner era).
83. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONALISM 27 (1990) (arguing that the framers were influenced by Locke's idea that
individuals create the state for the purpose of protecting their pre-political rights of prop-
erty); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
653, 667 (1985) ("The Lochner Court, too, saw the judicial role as the vindication of private
rights, defined by reference to market ordering within the common law, against government
'intervention.'"); John V. Orth, Taking from A and Giving to B: Substantive Due Process and the
Case of the Shiing Paradigm, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 337, 339-341 (1997) (discussing the his-
torical roots of this judicial formula).
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protect individual rights and otherwise to enhance the "general
welfare" rather than "the promotion of private interests.
8 4
The influence of this judicial ideology reached its peak during
the first three decades of the 20th century, the so-called "Lochner
Era, 8 5 when the Supreme Court struck down various legislative
schemes aimed at protecting the rights of workers to minimal pay,
limits on working hours, and the. right to unionize. 6 Similarly, the
Court ruled against the constitutionality of income tax during this
period. The Lochner regime began to erode during the second
decade of the 20th century and finally collapsed under the "New
Deal" reforms of the 1930s.8" Thereafter, the constitutionality of
regulatory legislation to achieve purely redistributive purposes has
not been questioned by the Supreme Court.90 Currently, the
84. SeeTRIBE supra note 82, at 571.
85. Id. at 567 (describing the "Lochner Era" in the Supreme Court's history).
86. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68-72 (1905) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (invalidat-
ing legislation that limited the working hours of bakery employees to 60 hours per week); see
also Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of the Dist. of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating
an act that provided fixed minimum wages for female employees as an unconstitutional
interference with the freedom to contract); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidat-
ing legislation that prohibited "yellow dog" contracts, requiring workers to refrain from
union membership); Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908); see also Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of
Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B. U. L. REV. 605,
617 (1996) ("By the first decade of the twentieth century, the Court was routinely writing
that economic regulation equated to taking property without compensation, and thus vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
87. Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding that the fed-
eral income tax law at stake was unconstitutional as violating the "direct tax" clauses). The
decision was accepted by a 5-4 majority and was considered shaky law even during the
Lochner Era. It drew widespread criticism and the Court manifested inconsistency in its
willingness to adhere to its principles during the years following the decision. See Erik M.
Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes" 33 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1057, 1107 (2001) (describing the public outcry against the decision and the widespread
condemnation of the Court in the press); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (refusing to
hold a progressive wealth tax law unconstitutional under the "direct tax" clauses); Bruce
Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 28-33 (1999) (arguing that
Pollock was an aberration from the previously developed doctrine in regard to the purposes
and functions of the direct tax clauses and was not upheld by subsequent decisions of the
Court). The Court saw its decision in Pollock reversed by the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.
See TRIBE supra note 82, at 574-75.
88. See TRIBE supra note 82, at 575 (reviewing the growing internal doctrinal tensions
in the Court's decisions particularly regarding the constitutionality of tax laws during the
first decades of the twentieth century).
89. The case generally thought to spell the downfall of Lochner is West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that the minimum wage act for women did not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was a valid exercise of the
state's police power to protect the health and safety of women).
90. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 891 (1987)
("The public use requirement [in eminent domain] traditionally meant that the property
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constitutional limits on the power of the government to redistrib-
ute wealth are minimal.9' To the extent that constitutional
constraints on redistribution exist, they limit the manner by which
the redistribution takes place rather than the permissible scope of
redistribution.2
To conclude this point: in the United States-as in most other
liberal democracies at the present time-there exists the possibility
for a (constitutionally legitimate) wide-range redistribution of
wealth through the political decision-making process (legislation,
etc.).9 3 It is important to emphasize that I do not claim that in lib-
eral democracy redistribution is a constitutional imperative, nor do
I argue that it is morally or socially sanctioned. Indeed, there exists
much disagreement about the political legitimacy of actual redis-
tributive actions. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that redistribution
is legitimate in principle and is constitutionally permissible in most
had actually to be used by the public. But gradually the requirement was expanded to refer
to any plausible public justification, including those that are redistributive in character.");
TRIBE, supra note 82, at 578-81 (discussing the shift in judicial doctrine in response to the
reforms of the New Deal); Orth, supra note 83 at 344 (noting that in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) the Court acknowledged the constitutionality of "regu-
latory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions," thereby rendering the
formula of "taking from A and giving to B" redundant). For an argument that--even to-
day-the judiciary has no authority to eliminate constitutional protections for economic
liberties, see BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIc LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 318-19
(1980) (calling for the revival of Lochners substantive due process doctrine).
91. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1701 (1984) ("[U]nder current law, by contrast [to the Lochner approach], all sorts of
redistributive measures are permissible.").
92. Under the Taking Clause, property must be taken for "public use." Since the Thir-
ties, the courts constantly and significantly broadened the meaning of "public use." See, e.g.,
DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY TAKINGS 196-97 (2002) ("[T]oday nearly
all courts have settled on a broader understanding that requires only that taking yields some
public benefit or advantage ... In addition, private transfers may satisfy the public use re-
quirement, so long as some public interest rationale ... can be cited in support of the
taking."). After the Lochner era, the courts also stopped setting constitutional boundaries for
police power and the powers of taxation. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. at 152 (acknowledging the constitutionality of legislation that regulates ordinary com-
mercial transaction); DANA & MERRILL supra at 198 (discussing the connection between
eminent domain, police power and taxation). Accordingly, the constitutional constraints on
redistribution through taking-minimal as they may be-are still more significant than
those regarding police power or taxation.
93. It should be noted that even after the Lochner era, the constitutional status of dis-
tributive governmental actions is inferior in the United States relative to other liberal
democracies, since in many countries there are constitutional provisions that mandate (some
level of) redistribution of wealth. See also Philip Alston, U.S. Ratication of the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365,
375 (1990) ("[W]ith the sole exception of the United States, all the Western democracies
have accepted the validity and equal importance of economic, social and cultural human
rights, at least in principle.").
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cases. 9 4 For the purpose of my current analysis, the existence of
such a possibility for redistribution-rather than any commitment
to any specific conception of redistribution-will suffice.
Before we proceed with an analysis of normative fundamentals
of liberal democracy let us briefly summarize the foregoing sec-
tions. From the above discussion we can infer the following
fundamental principles that characterize liberal democracy. These
principles are the following:
I. The division of the social polity into two principal
areas of social activity: the political and the eco-
• 95
nomic.
II. The existence of a requirement for equality in the
political sphere;
III. The abdication of such requirement in the eco-
nomic sphere;
IV. The existence of the possibility of redistribution of
property through the political process.
The juxtaposition of the above principles raises a major ques-
tion: What are the relationships between political equality (manifested in
principle Ii) and economic inequality (principle III)? That is, how
should we resolve instances of tension or collision between political
equality and economic inequality? This question will be dealt with
in detail in the course of the normative discussion in the following
section. However, it is possible at the current stage to point to a
tentative answer to this question by referring to the fourth
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
95. See also BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AvIRS, VOTING WITH DOLLARS, 12 (2002) (stress-
ing the differences in the organizing principles of markets and politics in a liberal
democracy). Admittedly, this division of the social polity into two realms is one-dimensional.
Its sole purpose is to serve the current discussion regarding the relationship between politics
and markets as they apply to the question of the constitutional arrangements in campaign
finance. It does not claim to encompass all the complexities of human interaction and the
various social relationships that may be discussed in regard to such interactions. There are
many alternative categorizations of realms of social relationship and many additional cate-
gories that may be considered relevant for such categorization. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OFJUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983) (discussing the ques-
tion of distributive justice in regard to various social spheres such as markets, public offices,
education, love and family, etc.).
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principle above. The very existence of the possibility of redistribu-
tion of economic assets by the (egalitarian) political process
implies that in liberal democracy it is an accepted postulate that
economic disparity should yield to political equality, whenever the
political process so decides.4 It should be noted that this Article
does not claim, as it is unnecessary to claim, that every economic
disparity is subject, in liberal democracy, to the possibility of redis-
tribution. Indeed, some actions of redistribution by the political
process may be banned by constitutional constraints, such as the
Takings Clause.: For the current analysis it suffices to say that in
those cases in which the possibility of redistribution exists-the prin-
ciple of political equality takes precedence over economic
disparity.98
96. Cf Michelman, supra note 79, at 1319 ("Most of us accept that in our constitutional
system government often may be justified in regulating the use or disposition of property,
even when the regulation obviously has serious distributional consequences.").
97. In a constitutional democracy there are some categories of decisions that can be
taken out of the reach of representative (majoritarian) institutions. Among such decisions, it
is possible to entrench the status of property rights by specifically limiting the power of legis-
latures (and other representative institutions) to infringe on those rights. Indeed, a forceful
historical analysis of the origins of the U.S. Constitution suggests that this was exactly one of
the main forces behind the formation of the constitution. The framers, influenced by the
Lockean ideology regarding the "natural" status of property rights and by fears of wide-
ranging populist distributive legislation, saw the entrenchment of property rights as one of
the central aims of constitutionalism. See NEDELSKY, supra note 83, at 207-9 (arguing that
the framers were primarily concerned with the dangers that popular sovereignty posed to
individual rights, and primarily to property rights: "the protection of property required dis-
proportionate power for the few with property since they needed to defend themselves
against the many without."); Michelman, supra note 79, at 1327-29 (discussing property as a
"paradigm of constitutionally protected private sphere" during the Republic's first century);
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 30 (1985) (stressing that the Constitution is designed to ensure
that certain kind of decisions-including those referring to property rights-would not be
made by electoral representatives). In a system whereby there are wide-ranging or even abso-
lute constitutional constraints on the ability of elected institutions to perform distributive
actions, the claim for any "superiority" of the ideal of political equality over the notion of
market disparities may lose much of its descriptive power. This is, however, not the state of
affairs in the United States today (or in most other liberal democracies). See notes 91-92
supra and accompanying text. That is, the claim that property holdings should be regarded
as "pre-political" and thereby not susceptible to infringement by majoritarian decision-
making does not reflect the current political or constitutional reality. Moreover, for the
purpose of the current analysis, it suffices that some economic disparities are subject to cor-
rection by the political process (even if other property rights enjoy constitutional immunity
from such correction). This is because in such a situation, there would be a question as to
the nature of the process by which those disparities (that are outside of the reach of constitu-
tional protection) would be corrected. For these cases, the claim in regard to the superiority
of the norm of political equality holds, and the question of its constitutional implications is
still relevant.
98. The claim with regard to the superiority of political equality over the lack of such
requirement for equality in the market sphere may carry with it implications that are outside
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C. Liberal Democracy-A Normative Account: The Argument
for Democratic Partnership
In the previous sections I presented some principles that are
central to understanding the relationship between markets and
politics in a liberal democracy. In the current section I wish to offer
a moral justification for these principles. 9 A moral justification for
political arrangement to be valid from a liberal point of view
should satisfy one fundamental condition, it should be valid in
principle for each and every individual in society (rather than for
some collective groups or group values).'0 I shall call this require-
ment the liberal imperative.
There is little question that the principle of political equality
meets the above requirement. 10A more complicated task is provid-
ing a justification for economic disparity from the point of view of
the field of campaign finance, and therefore outside the scope of the current analysis. See
discussion infra Part V.C.
99. I believe the positive account of liberal democracy presented above can illuminate
the fallacies in the current constitutional doctrine in the field of campaign finance and
justify its reform. The discussion of the moral justifications for the fundamental principles of
liberal democracy in the current Part supplies an additional ground for a critique of the
existing approach to campaign finance law.
100. SeeJeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundation of Liberalism, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COL-
LECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 44 (1993) ("[T]he liberal insists that intelligible justifications in
social and political life must be available in principle for everyone, for society is to be under-
stood by the individual mind, not by the tradition or sense of community .... If there is
some individual to whom a justification cannot be given, then so far as he is concerned the
social order had better be replaced by other arrangement, for the status quo has made out
no claim to his allegiance."); DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 188-90 (discussing the requirement
that the government will treat everyone with "equal concern and respect" as the fundamen-
tal thread of liberal ideology).
101. The claim that each and every individual enjoys full (and therefore equal) political
rights is an essential part of modern democratic theory. See Rawls supra note 59. It is based
on the ideas of individual autonomy and personal liberty as constitutive elements of person-
hood as such. It finds its roots in the very idea of humanism that is the general ideological
current to which liberalism (in its various versions) belongs. It is a central pillar of any lib-
eral theory It is manifested in the field of the electoral process by the desideratum of "one
person, one vote." So fundamental is this principle in any democratic theory, that we can
regard it, for the purpose of our discussion, as given. The intrinsic value of political equality
is well reflected in the writings of many liberal theorists. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT Ch. 6, 54, at 28 (J.W. Gough ed. 1946) ("equality ... as ...
equal right that every man hath to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will
or authority of any other man"); Ronald Dworkin, Introduction, in SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra
note 64, at 1-3 (discussing the requirement of equal concern and respect for every citizen as
the fundamental liberal principle); ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 84-87
(1989) (discussing the idea of "intrinsic equality" in democratic theory).
SUMMER 2004]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
the liberal imperative.1 2 Liberal democracy preserves the system of
market economy primarily for efficiency, to expand the social pie
relative to non-market alternatives. 1°3 However, the interests of each
and every member in the polity is preserved-despite the apparent
disparities created by the market-by the possibility of correction
of market disparities via the form of redistributive actions under
cohditions of equality. While the market creates a significant
amount of economic inequality, this inequality is subject to the
possibility of correction by distributive political decisions. Most im-
portantly, these distributive decisions are made under conditions
of complete political equality. That is, they are made within the
political realm without any interference of market disparities and
market forces in this process. The distributive process-carried out
under conditions of political equality°-assures the subjection of
102. The justification presented in the text is by no means the only argument that can
be raised to justify economic inequality in liberal democracy. One well-known right-based
argument raised as a justification for a regime of economic disparity is manifested by what is
known as Robert Nozick's "entitlement theory." According to this theory, property rights
(like any other right of the individual) are regarded as an essential part of personhood, and
hence no social or collective value can justify their infringement. (See ROBERT NozicK, AN-
ARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, iX (1974)). Nozick's theory objects to any kind of redistribution
and therefore cannot provide a moral justification for the current constitutional principles
presented above (ever since the demise of the Lochner era, see Section III.B below text near
note 88 supra). A second possible justification for market regime claims that a market econ-
omy is an essential condition for the preservation of democracy (see, e.g., HAYEK, supra note
70 at 220-21 (arguing that governmental intervention in the economic field is inherently
contradictory to the principles of individual freedoms); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS
AND MARKETS: THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 162-66 (1977) (explaining that
all existing "polyarchies" are market oriented). This justification, however, while justifying
market economy in general does not rule out the possibility of redistribution of goods, nor
does it explain the place of redistibution within the political framework. Yet, another popu-
lar justification for market regime (and the economic disparities entailed by it) is the
utilitarian argument that connects market economy with wealth maximization. The utilitar-
ian argument, while providing a powerful justification for market economy fails to meet the
requirement of the liberal imperative, since it addresses the overall efficiency and the general
welfare of society, rather than the interest of each and every individual (including the have-
nots), see, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 57 at 209-10 (noting that the utilitarian argument fails
to meet the fundamental liberal requirement for equal concern and and respect for all).
103. See, e.g., MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA: NEW THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY
AND THE WORLD 3-7 (1987) (discussing the grave economic problems of the Soviet Union as
the predominant reason for the comprehensive political reforms initiated during his ten-
ure); Richard Szawlowski, Book Review: Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World,
82 Am. J. INT'L L. 878, 880 (1988) (reviewing the fundamental economic problems that led
to the reforms in the Soviet Union).
104. By the term "political equality" or "complete political equality" I mean that politi-
cal decisions are accepted without any influence by economic disparities. There are various
different conceptions of equality in liberal democracy. See discussion supra Part IlA; see also
note 64 supra and accompanying text. While there is no need to present here a complete
theory of political equality, the very requirement for the isolation of the political process
from market influences implies, in itself, a relatively demanding conception of political
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the market regime to the imperative of democratic equality,
thereby supplying the moral justification required by the liberal
imperative.
In order to illustrate the relationship between the haves and the
have-nots under this regime let me describe democratic partner-
ship as a kind of a bargaining table around which both haves and
have-nots are seated. Each side (or each participant) has its own
interests in the outcome of this process of negotiation,' 5 but also-
what is of paramount importance-each has its own seat at the
negotiation table-and has an equal say and an equal vote in the
final decision. The haves, who are the big winners in the market
competitive game, are assumed to be interested to leave as many
economic goods as they can in their own hands. 10 6 This ambition is,
however, subject to the democratic decision of all participants, in-
cluding the have-nots. The have-nots, for their part, are assumed to
be interested in maximizing the extent of redistribution by this po-
litical process. This ambition is, however, constrained in two
different ways. First, the have-nots are not the only participants in
the process, but rather, they have only a relative share of the votes.
Second, and more important for my current discussion, the have-
nots are constrained-like any other participants in the process-
by the possible negative implications of redistributive decisions on
equality. See infra the discussion in this section. Thus, for example, a merely formal and
technical conception of equality that refers only to the formalistic aspects of political rights
and completely ignores the relative ability of the participants to influence the political proc-
ess cannot meet the requirement of political equality as presented here, since the
requirement that economic disparities will have no influence on the democratic decision-
making process cannot be satisfied by such formalistic analysis. See supra note 66.
105. Following the liberal tradition, the illustration in the text uses an individualistic vi-
sion of the person as a point of origin for the discussion of the justification of the social
order. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 63, at 9-13 (discussing the centrality of individualism in the
liberal tradition). This "atomistic" conception of the self has been subject to much criticism
on behalf of communitarian thinkers. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE, 28-35 (1982) (criticizing the Rawlsian methodology as skewed towards
atomistic individualism and away from community and fraternity). The current analysis
focuses on justifications of the social order from a liberal point of view, there is no reason to
deviate from this methodology.
106. In real life the motivations of participants in the social bargaining process are
more complex arnd may not correlate in full to their socio-economic position. Thus, for
example, some haves may be supportive of wide-range distribution of wealth out of all kinds
of altruistic motives. Likewise, some have-nots may, regardless of their current economic
inferiority, be supportive of market-oriented policies. See, e.g., DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 66 (1999) (discussing several empirical works regarding different standards
of desert adopted by people: "people judge that the appropriate reward depends on what
each person achieves"); DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 242-43 (1996)
(discussing the possibility of "constitutional altruism" on the part of the haves).
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the overall efficiency of the market system. "If we (all) redistribute
too much"-the haves would say to the have-nots (as in our imagi-
nary bargaining table illustration)-"that would fatally impair the
efficiency of the market system, and therefore there would be
much less to divide between us, so everybody would suffer."'0 °
Whatever decisions were made under this process, they would be
decisions accepted in a political process carried out under condi-
tions of political equality. That is, the exact scope of redistribution
in every phase of the process would be the result of a decision
made by all participants, including the have-nots. °"8
Thus, under the model of democratic partnership, economic
disparity in liberal democracy can be legitimized by the existence
of a distributive process carried out under conditions of political
equality. The decision of the current scope of redistribution (and,
in essence, the current state of division of economic goods) 09 is
accepted in a process in which all members of the polity take place.
The social order-including its economic disparities-is the out-
come of a democratic process in which all the participants have
equal political power and equal say. The economic disparities of
the market are legitimized by the vote of all the participants in the
process, including the have-nots. The have-nots are entitled to de-
cide-as much as any other member of the polity-how the social
resources should be divided. Each member of the polity has the
same influence on the decision with regard to her own share, and
her fellow members' share in the social pie. While have-nots do not
enjoy an equal share in the social pie itself, they do have an equal
107. While the illustration in the text is imaginary, it is not completely detached from
the reality of politics in current liberal democracies. Often, political debates in current de-
mocracies on issues such as taxation, social security, or privatization revolve around the
tension between the desire to increase the distribution of wealth and to reduce economic
inequality on the one hand, and the concern for the growth and stability of the economy on
the other hand. The concern for the overall wealth of society can serve as (at least) one
possible explanation for the fact that despite the possibility of massive redistribution (up to
the verge of complete abolition of the market system. Cf supra note 97. In liberal democra-
cies, such moves have not taken place in any western democracy. See OKUN, supra note 68, at
32-35 (discussing alternative explanations for the preservation of market regimes in western
democracies); Adam Przeworski, A Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in DEMOC-
RACY'S VALUE 23, 41-43 (Ian Shapiro & Adam Przeworski eds., 1999) (discussing various
explanations regarding why democracy does not bring about massive redistribution of
wealth); NEDELSKI, supra note 83, at 67 (reviewing the concerns raised by the framers re-
garding the threat posed by populist democracy to the regime of property rights).
108. The process of democratic debate is an ongoing process rather than a singular
event. Therefore, each participant can re-evaluate their position in regard to distributive
questions in accordance with the level of their satisfaction from their present share in the
social pie, their estimation as to the general state of the economy and so forth.
109. Subject only to some minimal constitutional constraints. See supra note 97.
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vote in the process that determines how to share this pie. Thus, the
social order is legitimized for each and every participant in the
democratic polity.
Liberal democracy can therefore be regarded as a democratic
partnership."" The alternative of a fully equal division of economic
goods is contingently rejected for reasons of efficiency."' The le-
gitimacy of the system, however, is guaranteed by the fact that each
and every member of society takes equal part in the process that
shapes the division of economic goods among all members of the
polity. Everyone is a full partner to this democratic decision-
making process.
D. The Social Inequality Paradox
If the fundamental moral justification for the socio-economic
order in liberal democracy is the political process of redistribution
under conditions of equality, how can it be that this very political
process of redistribution would be impaired by those inequalities
of the market that it is designed to correct?
If the way economic disparities in liberal democracy can be le-
gitimized is by a political process aimed at correcting the
inequalities of the markets, obviously this process of redistribution
should be immune from influence of economic disparities. In our
imaginative illustration of the bargaining table, the haves cannot
say to the have-nots the following: "You can participate in the redis-
tributive discussion-as long as you have enough money to pay for
your seats," for that would be a violation of both the requirement
for political equality and of the rationale of viewing the have-nots
as full partners for the liberal democratic project. 112 The liberal
110. For a different conception of "democratic partnership," see Dworkin, Free Speech
and the Dimensions of Democracy, supra note 24, at 76-79 (discussing the three dimensions of
democratic partnership as popular sovereignty, citizen equality, and democratic discourse).
111. The rejection of full equal division of economic goods is contingent since it is
founded on the empirical assumption that, based on current historical knowledge, it would
fatally impair the efficiency of the economic system, and would therefore decrease the over-
all wealth of society and is therefore rejected by the participants to the democratic
distributive process. Nothing in the proposed model of democratic partnership serves to
completely negate the possibility that such complete equal division of economic goods
would be the outcome of the democratic process. See supra notes 97 and 107.
112. Cf supra note 78 and accompanying text. Indeed, such was the state of affairs un-
der the libertarian regime in the Lochner era. To the extent that wealth was transferred by
the political process to the poor during this period, this was done not out of any recognition
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imperative requires that the have-nots possess the status of full
partnership. This could only be if all members, including the have-
nots, were secured under the requirement of strict political equal-
ity. Likewise, we cannot say to the have-nots who get near the table:
"You are allowed to sit here and to vote, but if you want to speak to
the other participants before the voting begins you should pay for
the cost of the microphone"-since this would entail the very same
result. Nor can we say to the have-nots, 'You can speak to the
crowd, but it is none of your business if some people use their
money to buy stronger loudspeakers that will (effectively) drown
your voice." This, as well, would not be to treat the have-nots as full
partners in the political process, and would thereby defeat the
moral rationale underlying the basic principles of liberal democ-
113
racy.
It should also be noted that when the disparities of the market
interfere with democratic procedures in a way that violates the re-
quirement of political equality, they create a vicious circle. The
very same process that is supposed to supervise and correct market
disparities is controlled by the same disparities and is therefore in-
capable of fulfilling its purpose. This impasse in the possibility of
effecting social change via the democratic process calls for the at-
tention of the judicial branch. This circularity will be called the
social inequality paradox.114
of partnership with the poorbut out of charity or some calculation of utility. See, e.g., WALTER
I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO THE WELFARE STATE 87-90 (6th ed. 1994) (discussing the
tension between the prevailing social philosophy of Spencer's Social Darwinism and the
Christian charitable tradition in late nineteenth century America).
113. The illustration of the negotiation table can be understood to suggest that many
other aspects of the political process, such as political speech, the mass media, etc., and not
only elections or campaign finance, should be isolated from the influences of the market.
Compare Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring)
("The Constitution often permits restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a
few from drowning out the many.") with the debate among the Justices in McConnel, infra
note 172. See infra Part V.C, note 173 and accompanying text.
114. The fact that market influences on the political process bring about circularity was
acknowledged by several liberal thinkers. See, e.g., AcKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 95, at 13
("If the deliberations of democratic citizens are crucial in the legitimation of market ine-
quality, we cannot allow market inequalities to have an overwhelming impact on these
deliberations.); Edward B. Foley, EqualDollars-Per-Voter, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1204, 1222 (1994)
("[W]hether the rich have a valid claim to the wealth they possess is precisely the issue to be
decided by the decision-making process."); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 24, at 277 ("[T]he
tyranny of private money corrupts the democratic relationship ... by assuring that wealthy
interests will set the parameters of political debate and the nature of the legislative
agenda."); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1406 (1986)
(suggesting that due to the influence of big business on politics, many fundamental political
questions are practically kept off the political agenda). Rawls himself, while discussing the
need "to keep political parties independent of large concentrations of private economic and
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF COURTS
IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Should courts espouse particular deference to campaign finance
regulation? Many proponents of campaign finance reform answer
this question positively while adopting a thin theory as to the role
of courts with regard to campaign finance. They argue that courts
should defer to legislators when faced with questions in the field.
Some claims for judicial deference are founded on the nature of
the constitutional questions regarding campaign finance reform."'
Other claims for deference are based upon the argument that
courts, in general, are ill-equipped to assess the complexities of the
campaign finance system." 6 This Article argue that this position is
social power in a private-property democracy," noted that such market influences create
"impasse" in the functioning ofjust democracy. See Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority,
supra note 68, at 42. For a discussion of agenda control by dominant political forces, see
Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Decisions and Nondecisions, 57 AMs. POL. SCi. REv. 632, 641
(1963) ("When the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power
relations among groups, and the instruments of force, singly or in combination, effectively
prevent certain grievances from developing in to full-fledged issues which call for decisions,
it can be said that a nondecision situation exists.").
115. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803-04 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that the courts should defer to legislature's judgment whenever the legislature invokes
state regulatory interests that are themselves derived from the First Amendment); Wright,
Money and the Pollution of Politics supra note 24, at 639-41 (arguing that the interests support-
ing caps on campaign expenditures derive from the values protected by the First
Amendment, and therefore, the constitutionality of campaign finance reform involves com-
peting First Amendment values and thus such legislation should escape strict scrutiny).
116. See Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the Flawed Postulates of Campaign Finance Reform,
3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 783, 798 (2001) (arguing that in reviewing the constitutionality of
campaign finance regulation, the judiciary should give "substantial deference" to legislative
judgments); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experi-
ence, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 608 (1982) (arguing
that remedial measures adopted by legislators against inequality in the relative ability of
competing groups to raise campaign contributions-should be upheld by the courts). See also
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 57 (1978) ("[Tlhe
best checks on corruption are a well-informed and issue-oriented electorate and a political
system that routinely produces challengers ready to take advantage of lapses by incum-
bents."). In view of the negative implications that Buckley had on the struggle to initiate
campaign finance reform, it is hardly surprising that the proponents of reform have re-
sorted to such theories. See Fredrick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1326, 1344 (1994) (pointing to the unwarranted link made by reform pro-
ponents between substantive arguments for reform and arguments calling for judicial
deference). Nor is it a surprise that some of the opponents of the reform adopted the re-
verse position, arguing for judicial activism in the field of campaign finance. See, e.g.,
Richard J. Baker, Constitutional Law: State Campaign Contribution Limits: Nixon v. Shrink Mis-
souri Government PAC: An Abridgment of Freedom in the Name of Democracy, 54 OKLA. L. REv.
373, 391 (2001) (arguing that contribution limits should be subjected to a strict standard of
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mistaken, and that there are strong reasons for the courts in a lib-
eral democracy to closely scrutinize the institutions of campaign
finance. Campaign finance questions are directly related to the
process of democratic decision-making, and, therefore, courts are
the institutions that are best suited to carry the primary responsi-
bility in this regard. To the extent that we leave the decision-
making on campaign finance issues in the hands of the legislators
the decision-making process suffers from an inherent difficulty that
must be accounted for by the supervisory process of judicial re-
view. 
117
A. The Constitutional Functions of Courts-
The Devices of Democracy
The judiciary in a liberal democracy differs from the two other
branches of government. It is often not elected, and the degree of
its accountability to popular democratic will is much lower than
the legislature and the executive."l It is therefore widely accepted
review); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign
Finance Reform, 73 CAL. I. REv. 1045, 1077-81 (1985) ("The historical ineptitude of legisla-
tures attempting electoral reform suggests that deference to legislative 'expertise' is
unwarranted.").
117. In this discussion, I follow Fredrick Schauer's "moderate realism," which empha-
sizes the importance of the judicial role with regard to democratic procedures. See Schauer,
supra note 116 at 1344. According to this approach, while there are some issues and ques-
tions on which the Constitutional text provides a specific determination (such as the
minimal voting age), most questions are not subject to such specific textual predetermina-
tion. Yet while the Constitution does not specifically deal with numerous details of
democratic procedure, there are provisions in the Constitution (such as the Fourteenth
Amendment) that could (and do) plausibly empower the courts to exercise judicial review
over a wide range of questions about the devices of democracy. In this Realist framework,
whether courts should be involved in monitoring decisions about democratic procedure is
not initially a question of constitutional "interpretation." Rather, it is primarily a question of
political theory, with the existing constitutional text providing a plausible ex postjustification
for whatever turns out to be the best answer to the question according to the theoretical
analysis of the nature of the relevant democratic institutions. This approach is particularly
suitable for the current discussion since the constitutional text contains very little specific
guidance as to the role of constitutionalism in serving as a workable framework for the op-
eration of democratic politics. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. I. REV. 643, 715 (1998) ("With respect to
democratic politics ... the American Constitution is a curious amalgam of textual silences,
archaic assumptions, and a small number of narrow, franchise-focused amendments that
reflect more modern conceptions of politics.").
118. The counter-majoritarian position of the judiciary is less apparent if judges are
publicly elected, as is the case for many state courts. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and
State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1157-58
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that courts, as a matter of institutional design, are not supposed to
make the day-to-day decision-making about most problems that are
brought to the public agenda of the democratic polity. Nor are
judges expected to routinely interfere in determinations when
made by the elected branches of government. " 9 Rather, the pri-
mary function of courts is to interpret and enforce decisions
(mostly authoritative rules) made by the other branches. Questions
such as the levels of income tax, the size of classes in elementary
schools, and the structure of a regulatory scheme of the banking
system are disposed by elected officials or appointed bureaucrats
who are directly accountable to elected officials.
Apart from their ordinary functions of interpreting the law and
adjudicating disputes, courts in liberal democracies also have some
additional, special functions that relate to the framework of social
arrangements. Courts carry the principal responsibility for the
reading and interpretation of constitutional documents. Accord-
ingly, courts are regarded as assuming responsibility for ensuring
that the fundamental conditions underlying the political process
are fulfilled. Courts carry a special responsibility to guarantee that
the rules of the game of the democratic political process will be
preserved. While courts are not to second guess the outcome of
(1999) (arguing that democratic concerns that motivate rationality review play a very differ-
ent role in the case of state court systems, in which judges are elected, than in federal
courts). Arguably, elected judges are required to bring into consideration constituent pref-
erences. See id. at 1158; c.f Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410-11 (1991) (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (asserting that elected judges are not representatives of the people). In any case,
elected judges have less ability to resist majoritarian pressures than non-elected judges. See
Richard Briffault, Public Funds and the Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 819
(2002) (discussing the impact of judicial campaigns on judicial impartiality); Scott D. Wie-
ner, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 187, 202-04 (1996) (contending that elective judiciaries violate due process); Martin
H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 498 (1986) ("[I]n cases involving the assertion of a liberty or prop-
erty interest in which the state is a party, the use of non-tenured state judges seems to be a
clear violation of procedural due process.").
119. See, e.g., Hershkoff, supra note 118, at 1157 (discussing democratic accountability as
the basis for judicial deference to legislative preferences under the "Rationality Review"
standard); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajonitarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road
to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 335 (1998) ("The problem is this: to the extent
that democracy entails responsiveness to popular will, how to explain a branch of govern-
ment whose members are unaccountable to the people, yet have the power to overturn
popular decisions?"); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 9 (1982) ("[G]overnmental policymaking ... ought to be subject to control by per-
sons accountable to the electorate."). See, e.g., DONALD L. HORWITZ, THE COURTS AND
SOCIAL POLICY 33-56 (1977) (discussing the various institutional limitations on the judicial
process to account for value-based, complex policy making decisions).
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the political game save in exceptional circumstances, "0 they carry
the primary responsibility to assure the fairness and vitality of the
political process itself.2' Courts have a special constitutional
responsibility to ensure that the democratic framework and its spe-
cific applications enable the members of the polity to participate
fully and freely in the political process, to express their opinion,
and to influence (by way of free elections and by other accepted
means of democratic participation) the decision-making process
within the political framework.1
2
The essential role of the judiciary with regard to democratic
procedures can be explained on the grounds of the relative profes-
sionalism and expertise that judges have in the field of the
application of rules, procedural rules in particular. The advocates
120. One notable exception to this general principle is when the judiciary comes across
systematic practices on behalf of majoritarian institutions (or those who currently hold
power) aimed at excluding a minority group from access to political competition, to dilute
its political power or to infringe on its basic liberties in any other way. See, e.g., Richmond v.J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) ("The history of racial classifications in this country
suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity
has no place in equal protection analysis."); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995)
("[W]here a State relies on the Department's determination that race-based districting is
necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act, the judiciary retains an independent obliga-
tion in adjudicating consequent equal protection challenges to ensure that the State's
actions are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest."). Judicial activism that is
motivated by the ambition to "rectify" situations of under-representation of certain groups
can hardly avoid, however, entering into a complicated outcome-oriented analysis, that is
inevitably value-based. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 608-09 (2002) (pointing to the failure of individual right-based approaches to
cope with complicated gerrymandering questions).
121. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
148-49 (1980) (presenting a process-based argument for judicial review); Michael J. Klar-
man, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L. Rv. 491 (1997)
(discussing various cases of malfunctions in the electoral process that call for judicial inter-
vention under process-based theory); Issacharoff, supra note 117 (Applying process-based
argument to malfunctions in the electoral system). For the discussion of the distinction
between process and substance in this context see infra Part C and text accompanying note
144.
122. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258-59 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (justifying
judicial intervention by asserting that "the majority of the people of Tennessee have no
'practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls' to correct the existing
'invidious discrimination' . .. I have searched diligently for other 'practical opportunities'
present under the law. I find none other than through the federal courts. The majority of
the voters have been caught up in a legislative straitjacket"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
566 (1964) ("[W]e are told that the matter of apportioning representation in a state legisla-
ture is a complex and many-faceted one. We are advised that States can rationally consider
factors other than population in apportioning legislative representation. We are admon-
ished not to restrict the power of the States to impose differing views as to political
philosophy on their citizens. We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political
thickets and mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally pro-
tected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us.").
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of the process theory of judicial review, however, emphasize an-
other crucial advantage of the judiciary in this respect. The
judiciary's relative detachment from day-to-day political activity and
isolation from the strong pressures and temptations which are typi-
cal to the positions of the other participants in the political
game."' Judges are not ideologically "neutral" or immune from
political bias.1 14 But, in situations of political crisis, judges are in a
relatively good position to evaluate such questions without being
influenced by the potential implications of their decision on their
own status. For example, when the question is whether the elec-
tions in a given system were open and fair, courts of law are the
preferred, if not the exclusive, vehicle to deal with the issue. 21 This
is not primarily because judges have expertise in reading the rules
of elections and understanding the procedures, but because they
are assumed to be located "outside" the arena of political contest
123. See Schauer, supra note 116, at 1337 ("[E]ven those procedural decisions that are
not explicitly constitutionalized ought ... to be made by, or, more plausibly at least subject
to be reviewed by, institutions removed from the substantive interests of day-to-day politics-
most notably the courts."). The above argument for the justification ofjudicial review under
process-based theory is far from exhausting the several possible justifications for judicial
review or reflecting the wide variety of arguments and critiques regarding the power of
courts to rely on constitutional doctrines to second-guess choices made by legislatures. See
generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITIONAL LAW 16-18 (14th ed.
1980) (reviewing various competing arguments for the justification of judicial review);
Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALIMS AND
DEMOCRACY 195, 235-36 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (suggesting that judicial
enforcement of the constitution is justified on the basis of social precommitment); Bruce A.
Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (arguing for the special role
of the judiciary in signaling "constitutional moments" in which "constitutional politics" takes
the place of normal "faction-oriented" politics).
124. See Frank I. Michelman, Property and the Politics of Distrust: Liberties, Fair Values and
Constitutional Method, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 91, 112, n.76 (1992) (pointing out that "the justifi-
cations for judicial review have, to date, been remarkably inattentive to the fact that judges,
too, are plausible objects of distrust"); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing
Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 30 ("Members of the judiciary, responsible for upholding the values
protected by the first amendment, are not immune from the same process of socialization
and indoctrination that predispose the general public to certain perspectives."); Fredrick
Schauer, The Calculus of Distrust, 77 VA. L. REV. 653, 655 and n. 5 (1991) (stressing that the
sources of distrust for government apply also to distrust ofjudges).
125. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down an Alabama appor-
tionment as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
155 (1986) (stating that judicial interference is warranted when "the electoral system is ar-
ranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on
the political process as a whole"); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 31 (stating that judicial
interference is warranted when a minority group has encountered structural obstacles allow-
ing majority voters "usually to defeat the minority preferred candidate").
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and therefore serve as relatively neutral arbitrators to resolve the
question evenhandedly.
2 6
According to the process theory, it is the role of the courts to in-
tervene where it may reasonably be assumed that the possibility of
a political change through the democratic mechanism is blocked,
that the current legal framework is structured in a way that pre-
vents or impairs open and fair competition in the democratic
arena. Those who are likely to oppose change and are currently in
a position to control the very conditions under which change can
occur may act to prevent it. As John Hart Ely suggests:
Malfunction [of the political process] occurs.... when ... the
ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure
127that they will stay in and the outs will stay out...
126. One critique of the process-based approach is that it confers on the judiciary itself
the task of delineating the scope and limits of its intervention in political judgments of the
other branches. One aspect of this critique deals with the difficulties distinguishing between
process and substance. See infra Part C and text accompanying note 144. Even in the realm
of purely "procedural" review there may be debate about the proper limits of judicial inter-
vention and there is a danger that the judiciary will misuse its power. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. at 337 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Courts are unable to decide when it is that an appor-
tionment originally valid becomes void because the factors entering into such a decision are
basically matters appropriate only for legislative judgment."); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at
621 (1964) (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("Generalities cannot obscure the cold truth that cases of
this type are not amenable to the development of judicial standards."). Indeed, the recent
intervention of the Court in the recount procedures in Florida in the course of the 2000
presidential election may serve as an effective illustration of this danger. See Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000). While the case of Bush v. Gore can point to some limits of process-based
theory it can hardly seriously put into question its basic assumptions. As Dorf and Issacharoff
pointed out, to assume that process theory provides a principled basis forjudicial interven-
tion when majoritarian democracy runs astray does not imply that judges acting under such
theory will never err, a risk that is hardly confined to process theory. See Michael C. Dorf &
Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts? 72 COLO. L. Rrv. 923, 943 (2001).
Thus, there is reason to contend that the Court in Bush v. Gore did not keep to the principles
of judicial intervention under the process-based theory as applied in its own jurisprudence
in previous cases. See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 638
(2001) (pointing to the fact that before this decision the Court consistently refused to apply
the doctrine to look into election outcomes as opposed to review of procedures and general
conditions at the pre-election phase). In any case, the process-based argument here pre-
sented in regard to campaign finance fits well within the traditional boundaries of the
theory, as applied to voting procedures, and is hardly influenced by the debate in regard to
judicial intervention after the votes were cast.
127. ELY, supra note 121, at 103. See also Klarman, supra note 121, at 530-40 (discussing
various cases of blocks in the electoral system asjustifyingjudicial intervention); Issachroff &
Pildes, supra note 117, at 651 (distinguishing between different forms of political "lockups").
It should be noted that process-based arguments can be distinguished into two categories.
The first category refers to situations in which some minority groups suffer from inherent
disadvantage resulting from their "isolation" (i.e. their inability to form effective coalitions
with other political groups within the arena of pluralistic politics). This situation is discussed
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In such situations, there is no point in expecting those who hold
the power to make the substantive decisions and control the possi-
bility of change in the division of that power would voluntarily
change the conditions that brought them into power. Those who
repeatedly win the democratic "game" have no incentives to ques-
tion the rules. '
Courts are not completely immune from the biases that affect the
other branches of government. After all, judges are nominated by
the current winners of the electoral-political system.1'2  Neverthe-
less, the degree to which the judiciary is influenced by these biases
is significantly lower than the degree to which the other branches
of government are. The judiciary in liberal democracy normally
enjoys a significant amount of personal, professional, and institu-
tional autonomy. Judges are nominated for life, or at least for long
periods that do not overlap with the tenures of the executive
branch, and their salaries are fixed by legislation;130 the judicial
by Ely in the context of "discrete" and "insular" minorities. See ELY supra note 121, at 103,
135. The second category of "blocks" in the channels of political change refers to malfunc-
tions in representative politics that are not directly related to the interests of disadvantaged
minorities (such as questions as to term limits of incumbents). See Klarman, supra note 121,
at 509-15. Contrary to the first category, the role of the judiciary in regard to the second
category is not stricto senso counter-majoritarian (to use the well-known terminology pre-
sented by Alexander M. Bickel). See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
16 (1962) (discussing the counter-majoritarian role of the judiciary); Klarman, supra note
121, at 501. The distinction between the two categories is not, however, always simply made.
See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 120 (discussing vote dilution cases and other access barriers
set on clearly racial grounds in Southern states in the context of general anti-competitive
barriers for political change). See also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 117 at 645 (criticizing
the Supreme Court's attempts "to fold difficult questions of democratic politics and judicial
review into the conventional regime of rights-based constitutional and statutory law"). This
distinction also bears significance on the discussion here of campaign finance legislation. See
infra Part D and text accompanying note 144.
128. See Schauer, supra note 116, at 1338.
129. The situation is very different where judges are elected. See supra note 118. Elected
judges seem ill-equipped to serve as "independent" arbitrators of the current rules of the
game, since they are directly influenced by these rules, and in particular the rules regarding
campaign finance. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need
for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 133
(1998) (arguing that the current rules of campaign finance forjudicial election infringe on
the courts' autonomy).
130. The Constitution provides some protection by insulating judges from dismissal or
salary cuts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see United States v Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-20 (1980)
(discussing tenure and salary clauses as an aspect ofjudicial independence). For discussions
of the importance of the tenure and salary provisions for an independent and impartial
judiciary. See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78 & 79, at 464-75 (A. Hamilton) (Mentor ed.
1961) (referring to the appointment ofjudges for tenure as "the citadel of the public justice
and public security"); Sam J. Ervin, Separation of Powers:Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 108 (1970) (describing the history of the struggle for judicial independence);
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decision-making process is predominantly bounded by legal rules
and doctrines, grounded in principled reasoning rather than po-
litical calculations.'
While they do not guarantee complete judicial independence,
these factors make judges much suitable to cope with situations of
blocks in the channels of political change than elected politicians.
It is safer to leave the decisions about the integrity and fairness of
the electoral system in the hands of judges.1 3 ' The institutional
autonomy of courts in democratic societies makes them the "natu-
ral"-if not perfect-candidates for performing this supervisory
function in those situations of (alleged) "block" or "lockup" in the
channels of political change.1
3
Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. CHI. L.
REv. 665 (1969).
131. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 365-66
(1978) (arguing that the characteristic feature of the judiciary is deciding cases on the basis
of reasoned argument, and only issues that can be resolved by that approach are appropri-
ate for judicial resolution). This nature of the judicial function also carries some inherent
claim for self-restraint regarding the judges' own personal preferences. See, e.g., Frank I.
Michelman, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 74 (1986) (discussing the
counter-majoritarian role of the judiciary in the context of the republican ideal of self-
government).
132. Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas,
94 COLUM L. Rav. 1258, 1278 (1994) (advocating a "premise of distrust" in regard to legisla-
tive motivations in the field of campaign finance); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and
Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Refo-m, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1074 n. 156 (1996)
("[I] ncumbent lawmakers will always have powerful personal incentives to set spending caps
at a level that disadvantages their challengers."); Strauss, supra note 52, at 1386 (arguing that
leaving congress to promote "equality" without providing reasonably precise guidelines is
likely to produce even more protection for political incumbents); Sunstein, supra note 11, at
1400 (noting the inherent risk in any campaign finance legislation that it enables existing
legislators to promote their own interests); Klarman, supra note 121, at 537 (noting that this
is the one point that both campaign finance reform proponents and opponents agree
upon).
133. This is not to say that the initial responsibility for assuring the efficiency and fair-
ness of campaign finance systems should not rest in the hands of independent agencies,
such as the Federal Election Committee, see2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (2) (2003), or in the hands of
delegates and experts that are otherwise affiliated with the bureaucracy or to the legislature,
and as long as the ultimate responsibility of assuring the integrity and fairness of such insti-
tutions rests with the independent judiciary. Such agencies, however, should also be
designed to be able to avoid ideological biases and to sustain political pressures. See ACKER-
MAN & AYPEs, supra note 95, at 128-133 (arguing that retired federal judges are the best
group of potential watchdogs able to serve as the heads of the FEC).
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B. The Courts and the Social Inequality Paradox
Part III of this Article presented a conception of liberal democ-
racy based on the distinction between two realms of social activity:
Politics and Markets. Courts, no doubt, have many important func-
tions in these fields. The previous section described the paramount
role of the judiciary in ensuring the fairness and openness of the
democratic political system. Many theorists have acknowledged
that a strong and independent judicial system is one of the corner-
stones of the free market system, one of the central components of
the well-known doctrine of the Rule of Law. 34 From this point of
view, the judiciary must perform its function in order to ensure
that markets will remain open and competitive.
35
While the role of courts to supervise the integrity and enforce-
ment of the rules of of markets and the rule of politics has been
widely recognized by theorists, the vital role of the judiciary to gov-
ern the relationship between politics and markets has been much
neglected. 3 1 While we have long had a theory of the functions of
courts within these spheres, we have yet to develop a satisfactory
theory of the role of courts in regulating the relationship between
them. The relationship between markets and politics is fundamen-
tal to the understanding of the constitutional framework of liberal
democracy and it merits greater attention from constitutional
theorists. 1
37
134. See, e.g., FREDRICK A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERaDoM 38-39 (1944) (stressing that
viable economic competition can only be carried out in "an intelligently designed and con-
tinuously adjusted legal framework"); HAYEK, supra note 70, at 224-26 (stressing the
importance of a general system of legal rules to serve as the infrastructure for market activi-
ties); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1398-99 n. 40 (citing HAYEK, supra note 70, at 224-26).
135. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 603 (1976) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring) (stating that it is settled policy of the Supreme Court to give "concrete meaning to
the general language of the Sherman Act by a process of case-by-case adjudication of specific
controversies"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agenty In-
terpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301, 307 (1988) ("[1]n the context of the
Sherman Act, policy making is an appropriate and inevitable judicial role, because the judi-
ciary, as the only institution empowered to resolve cases or controversies, must make the
policy decisions necessary to decide a particular case or controversy.").
136. This is true even though markets and politics are sometimes juxtaposed for pur-
poses of comparisons and analogies. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 117, at 646
(arguing that "politics shares with all markets a vulnerability to anti-competitive behavior).
137. The relationships between market and politics have been subject to various works
in political theory. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 59 and note 68 (discussing the justifications
for the priority of the principle of equal liberties over the principles of market freedoms);
WALZER, supra note 95, at 95 (delineating the social sphere in which economic power can
legitimately operate). See also C. B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN
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Campaign finance is a classic example of where the judiciary
must regulate this relationship. On the one hand, the question of
redistribution of economic goods is one of the central questions of
the democratic process. On the other hand, the distortions created
by market inequalities may control the conditions under which this
political process is conducted. If the question of the magnitude of
economic inequalities is to be discussed and decided by routine
democratic discussions between the representatives of the various
segments and groups in society, the process of selecting the repre-
sentatives must be immune from the influences of these very
inequalities. If the haves are allowed to use their economic lever-
age in order to forestall or inhibit the democratic process of
redistribution, then the channels of political change are blocked.
Therefore, in the field of campaign finance there is often an
impasse in the democratic process that justifies the intervention of
the judiciary. Process theory suggests that we cannot assume those
who hold power would preserve rules enabling their demise. Those
who control the political process through superior economic
power would not be willing to change the rules of the game to di-
minish the advantages they now enjoy.
The situation calls for the interference of an "external" arbitra-
tor less subject to the biases and temptations than the other
participants in the democratic process. The judiciary in liberal de-
mocracies is not completely immune from the influences of
disparities of wealth on the governmental system. Judges often
form part of the ruling wealthy elite.139 Unlike politicians, however,
RETRIEVAL 39-76 (1973) (discussing the relationship between competitive markets and
democratic values); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 141-167
(1993) (arguing against the imposition of market norms in the political field).
138. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 644 n.9
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("[T]here is good
reason to think that campaign reform is an especially inappropriate area for judicial defer-
ence to legislative judgment. What the argument for deference fails to acknowledge is the
potential for legislators to set the rules of the electoral game so as to keep themselves in
power and to keep potential challengers out of it.") (citations omitted) (citing ELY, supra
note 121).
139. See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860,
85-99 (1977) (suggesting that the development of negligence rules during the nineteenth
century should be explained by the tendency of judges to support the interests of emerging
industry); Keith N. Hylton, A Note on Trend-Spotting in the Case Law 40 B.C. L. REv. 891, 892
(1999) (discussing the argument that "judges who are members of the economic elite will
tend to hand down decisions that favor the elite");John 0. Calmore, Close Encounters of the
Racial Kind: Pedagogical Reflections and Seminar Conversations, 31 U.S.E L. REv. 903, 909 (1997)
(discussing the realist view that "law becomes a means of oppression or of social control by
the political, cultural, and economic elite of which judges are a part"). See also supra Part V.B
and text accompanying note 126.
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judges' fates do not directly depend on the outcomes of their deci-
sions in the field of campaign finance.140 This fact, along with the
comparative institutional autonomy of the judicial branch, 4' puts
that branch in the best position to fairly regulate the campaign fi-
142
nance system.
Therefore, there is a strong justification for judicial activism in
the field of campaign finance. Much as we expect the judiciary to
assure that the channels of political change are free from interfer-
ence, so should we expect the judiciary to assume an active role to
ensure the fairness of the political process of redistribution under
conditions of political equality. Not only should the courts not de-
fer to legislators on questions of campaign finance-but it is a
constitutional imperative that courts supervise campaign finance
practices to ensure accordance with the requirements of political
equality.
143
140. See ISSACHAROFF, ET. AL., supra note 66, at 90. The relative advantages of courts
over politicians in this respect are significantly diminished ifjudges are elected for office, as
they are in some states. If judges face elections to their own posts, they would also need
campaign financing and may well be dependent on those who are economically powerful.
See, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1489,
1491 (2001) ("Ajudge's obligation of neutrality is totally at odds with seeking the support of
organized groups that have clear goals .... ). See also supra notes 118 and 129.
141. See supra Part V.A and text accompanying note 130.
142. See supra note 133.
143. It is worth noting that the notion that the judiciary carries extended responsibility
to ensure the competitiveness and openness of the electoral system by closely supervising
legal arrangements in the field of campaign finance is manifested in the jurisprudence of
other liberal democracies. For example, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht) demonstrated a strong willingness to intervene in legislative decision-making in
the campaign finance field in order to ensure the interest of voters' equality and openly
acknowledged the danger related to undue economic influences on the electoral process.
Party Finance Case II, 8 BverfGE 51 (1958) translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONsTi-
TUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 201-03 (2d ed. 1997). In the Party
Finance Case II, the Court struck down legislation that permitted taxpayers to deduct dona-
tions to political parties from taxable income. Id. The Court noted that there was no specific
prohibition on such donations in the German Basic Law, but nevertheless, the legislation
should by struck down since it infringes on the general principle of voter equality. Id. The
Court stated that the option given to taxpayers to deduct political donations gives unequal
opportunity to the wealthy to influence parties' platforms. Id. Hence, it stated that "the chal-
lenged provisions ... favor those parties whose programs and activities appeal to wealthy
circles." Id. For a review of the activist policies of the German Constitutional Court in the
campaign finance field see id. at 200-15; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 116 at 695-97. Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court of Israel has demonstrated willingness to intervene in campaign
finance legislation. In H.C. 98/69, Bergman v. Minister of Finance, 23(1) P.D. 693 translated
in PUBLIC LAw IN ISREAL 310 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds. 1996), the Court struck
down legislation by the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) that aimed to worsen the conditions
under which newcomer parties (not currently represented in the House) were financed
during elections. Id. The decision of the Court was based on a wide interpretation of the
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C. Process Theory and Value-BasedJudgments in Campaign Finance
Since this Article's argument in favor ofjudicial activism in cam-
paign finance is based on the process theory of judicial review, it
needs to answer the critique that while process-based arguments
claim to justify judicial interference on the basis of procedural mal-
functions in the democratic process, they cannot avoid substantive
commitments on controversial issues. 144 For example, when a court
seeks to apply procedural review in case of a failure or "block" re-
garding the representation of a certain minority group, it cannot,
in essence, avoid making a value-based judgment as to the baseline
of such analysis, that is, as to the "proper" level of representation
for the group at stake.1 45 Correspondingly, critics claim process
theories lack a coherent distinction between process failures and
substantive judgments about the outcomes of democratic competi-
tions.
146
The process-based argument presented here is relatively resis-
tant to this critique. The argument in favor ofjudicial activism in
this field is predicated on the substantive value-based judgments
underlying the conception of liberal democracy that I have called
constitutional requirement of "one man one vote" provided by the Basic Law: The Knesset.
Id. at 315.
144. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) ("[T]he process theme by itself determines almost nothing
unless its presuppositions are specified, and its content supplemented, by a full theory of
substantive rights."); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,
739-40 (1985) (arguing thatjudges applying process-based review cannot refrain from mak-
ing substantive judgment as to the existence of prejudice against certain minorities); Daniel
R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allures and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 721,
742 (1991) ("[A]ny attempt to identify process imperfections ultimately must employ sub-
stantive judgments."); Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 235 (1981) (arguing that process-based theories do not succeed in
establishing even a relative advantage over substantive theory in regard to their claim to be
value neutral).
145. See Tribe, supra note 144 at 1072-77 (arguing that the classification of a certain
group as an "insular minority" necessitates a pre-determined value-based judgment regard-
ing the reasons which differentiate between this group and the rest of the population). See
also Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE
L.J. 31, 49-50 (1991) (arguing that interest group theory serving as ajustification for judi-
cial activism is inherently dependent on the need to identify a normative baseline for the
evaluation of the competing claims for political influence of each group).
146. SeeAckerman, supra note 144, at 718 (posing the question whether and to what ex-
tent process-based evaluation of a racial law enacted by an all-white legislature would be
affected by the fact that this legislature was elected by a group of voters composed of 75%
blacks).
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democratic partnership. 147 Once it is accepted, however, that those
who enjoy economic advantages in the market are not entitled to
exploit these advantages to replicate the same disparities in the
political decision-making process, the theory does not require any
additional value-based judgment as to the relative power, represen-
tation or other political faculties of given groups or individuals, or
as to the "rightness" of any particular political outcome. Naturally,
when the court comes to review certain legal arrangements to ap-
ply the principle of political equality, there may be much room for
judicial discretion. Likewise, the court may be required to balance
all kinds of values in competition with the requirement of political
equality in the field of campaign finance."' Such value-based analy-
sis is inherent to any judicial decision-making process. This type of
analysis, however, differs from an analysis of the outcomes of the
political process. Unlike some other process-based arguments, my
argument does not require courts to evaluate the fairness of the
process in terms of the ultimate success of certain groups or fac-
tions within the democratic political competition.
It is important to stress in this respect that in no place in this Ar-
ticle do I argue that the poor (or any other socio-economic group)
in liberal democracy should be viewed as a "discrete" or "insular"
minority.49 Nor do I argue that the have-nots merit special treat-
ment as such by the judiciary as the result of the normative analysis
presented above, or that the judiciary should intervene in the
147. See supra Part III.C. It should, however, be noted that this position regarding judi-
cial activism in the field of campaign finance can be sustained on the basis of more general
process-based arguments in regard to the role of the judiciary in supervising the ways by
which legislators (and other incumbents) frame the legal arrangements that control condi-
tions regarding their re-election process. See supra Part B.
148. In particular, there may be a need to examine competing claims based on individ-
ual liberties. See infra Part V.B.
149. See Justice Stone's observation in United States v. Carolene Pmducts Co., 304 U.S. at
152 n. 4 and ELY, supra note 121. Ely himself does not believe that the poor fit into this
paradigm. See id. at 162 (explaining that "the theory of suspicious classification will thus be
of only occasional assistance to the poor, since their problems are not often problems of
classification ... ."). Other scholars, however, have argued that the poor do merit height-
ened protection by the Court. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 144, at 738-39 (arguing~that
process based theory unavoidably involves substantive judicial analysis, among which legisla-
tive prejudices against the poor should be accounted for); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Exploring a
Substantive Approach to Equal Justice Under Law, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 411, 431-32 (1998) (arguing
that the poor suffer from inherent inferiority in the political process which justifies their
classification as a "discrete and insular minority"); Loffredo, supra note 79, at 1278, 1331-40
(arguing that the political powerlessness of the poor requires some form of enhanced judi-
cial protection). But see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (holding that
the constitutionality of social welfare legislation must be assessed under the same deferential
form of rationality review applicable to commercial regulations).
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outcomes of debates over distributive questions.5 0 Assuming that the
requirements of democratic partnership are met, the have-nots
have no inherent disadvantage within the democratic negotiation
process. Nor would the haves enjoy any prima facie advantage in this
process, since they are not entitled to use their economic position
as political leverage. Likewise, the have-nots will not suffer a com-
parative inability to form coalitions or use their political power.151
Under the theory of democratic partnership, distributive ques-
tions should be decided by majoritarian political institutions,
which are accountable to their constituencies. The role of thejudi-
150. This is not to deny that there may be other arguments in political theory-apart
from the one presented in the current essay-that may call for special treatment for the
have-nots in the liberal state, or assign the judiciary special responsibility in that regard. See
supra note 62.
151. Indeed, there is a possibility that on some occasions the have-nots (or any sub-
group, such as, for example, the 5% who are the least advantaged, and therefore those
whose claims for redistribution are the most extensive) will find themselves in an inferior
position vis-h-vis other groups that compete over political influence in the pluralist settings
of liberal democracy. This may occur for various reasons, including the size of this sub-
group, or the fact that they are unable to form effective coalitions with other groups. See
RORBERT DAHL, PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, 22-32 (1956) (discussing democratic
politics as a continuing process of interaction between minority groups). The fact that this
group of have-nots suffers from inferiority on the political level does not call for any external
intervention in the democratic process (such as on the part of the judiciary) as long as this
inferiority is not the result of the influences of economic disparities on the political process
itself. In other words, in the course of the political process in a pluralist democracy there
may be some groups (including the have-nots) that may find themselves in a situation of
political inferiority. According to the argument presented here, however, as long as the po-
litical process is isolated from the influences of market disparities, there is no reason for
judicial intervention. Thus, for example, it is commonly asserted that often the most domi-
nant group in the political process is the middle class. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism,
Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accountingfor the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 552, 584 (1999) (arguing that state fiscal policies are dominated by middle class inter-
ests); Loffredo, supra note 79, at 1340 n. 287. This may work against the interests of the very
poor who form a much smaller group, but it can also work against other small groups (in-
cluding the very rich!). As long as we assume, however, that the economic power of any of
these groups bears no influence on the political process (which is the case under democratic
partnership) there is no justification, under this theory, for external intervention in the
political process. There may be, of course, other arguments in favor ofjudicial intervention
to rectify "market failures" in the political process, but these are beyond the scope of the
current discussion and are not related to the thesis presented here. Compare DANIEL A. FAR-
BER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 67-73 (1991) (discussing the argument
that courts should interfere in rent-seeking legislation) with Elhuge, supra note 145 (criticiz-
ing interest group theory as the basis for judicial intervention in democratic decision-
making). See also infra note 154. For the same reasons it is also unimportant for my argument
to provide definitions of the terms "haves" and "have-nots." I assume that there are various
groups that have different socio-economic interests-in accordance with their economic
status-at different points in time. The interaction between such groups is part of the nor-
mal course of democratic politics and should not serve as a ground for judicial intervention
as long as this is done under conditions of equality in terms of isolation of the process from
market influences.
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ciary is to see that this decision-making process is carried out under
conditions of equality (that is, in isolation from the influences of
market disparities). The question whether, or to what extent, the
democratic process delivers outcomes that are socially 'just" or
economically egalitarian, are completely beyond the scope of judi-
cial analysis, and the issue of the substantive state of distribution in
society, is outside the scope of judicial scrutiny. 52 In fact, the de-
mocratic process under democratic partnership is highly likely to
produce a certain level of economic gaps among the different
socio-economic groups, all in accordance with the wishes, interests,
shared responsibilities, and other considerations of each partici-
pant, as manifested through the democratic decision-making
process (and under conditions of equality) .1 3 All this however,
should be-according to the current analysis-completely beyond
the scope ofjudicial review.154
152. The judiciary is of course in charge of enforcing any social rights to the extent that
such rights are provided for by law or by specific provisions of the Constituntion. See supra
note 93.
153. See supra Part III.C and text accompanying note 107.
154. There is, of course, a possibility that even if the foundations of democratic partner-
ship-as advocated in this article-are accepted, we may still encounter grave economic
inequalities at the level of the outcomes of the democratic political process, to the extent
that would seem unjust to some, or even to many. Would that serve as ajustification for value-
based judicial intervention to correct such inequalities in outcome? See Ackerman, supra
note 146. The answer, under the current argument of democratic partnership, must still be
in the negative. Indeed, there is a possibility that on the empirical level, the vision of democ-
ratic partnership would fail to deliver its promise. In such a case we shall face three
alternative responses. First, we may regard the apparent inequalities in the distributive out-
comes as an indication that the procedural safeguards in such a given polity proved to be
insufficient to ensure the effective isolation of the political discourse from market influ-
ences. This may justify reevaluation of the current system of procedural safeguards
(including the arrangement of campaign finance), and possibly the introduction of addi-
tional and improved safeguards (in accordance with the foundations of democratic
partnership, and with no need for the injection of value-based substantive demands on the
level of outcomes). Second, we may come to the conclusion that, in the absence of any indi-
cations that the current distributive discourse is carried out under conditions of procedural
inequality, we must accept the outcomes of this process as morally just, or at least as politi-
cally legitimate. And in any case, there is no ground, under the assumptions of democratic
partnership, to second-guess the outcomes of a distributive political process carried out
under conditions of political equality. Alternatively, we may reach a conclusion that proce-
dural safeguards as such are insufficient to ensure a sufficient level of socio-economic
equality in liberal democracy, and thus there is a need for the introduction of substantive
social vehicles (such as some minimum of constitutional rights, regarding the minimal level
of income and so forth). If we adopt the latter strategy, however, we clearly transgress the
boundaries of democratic partnership (and inevitably engage ourselves in value-based moral
evaluations). Whether, or to what extent, such an empirical scenario is probable is beyond
the current discussion. The purpose of the discussion in the text is only to stress that as long
as we stick to the boundaries of democratic partnership, there is no need for an external
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V. OBJECTIONS: GROUP PLURALISM AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A. The Diversity of the Political Agenda
Some may argue that my discussion of liberal democracy as-
sumes a rather limited and monolithic vision of politics in liberal
democracy: that politics revolve exclusively around distributive
questions and that I neglect the richness and diversity of political
questions. Many groups in democratic polities differ in their be-
liefs, interests and preferences. Different groups may accumulate
different degrees of influence and political power in different set-
tings. There is no reason-so the argument proceeds-to treat the
wealthy differenly than any group that struggles to promote its
interests.155
The objection assumes that we can distinguish between distribu-
tive and non-distributive issues. One can doubt whether such a
distinction is possible,156 and whether, even if the distinction is
valid, the logical result should be that we should put up with the
influence of money on politics. In other words, even if we suppose
that some issues on the political agenda are "distributive" and oth-
ers are "non-distributive" in nature, one may wonder if the
centrality of distributive questions does not justify the isolation of
the political arena from market influences altogether, even if this
reevaluation of the outcomes of the democratic discourse on the part of the judiciary or any
other player in the constitutional arena.
155. See McConnel, 124 S. Ct. 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It cannot be denied, however,
that corporate (like noncorporate) allies will have greater access to the officeholder, and
that he will tend to favor the same causes as those who support him (which is usually why
they supported him). That is the nature of politics-if not indeed human nature-and how
this can properly be considered 'corruption' (or 'the appearance of corruption') with re-
gard to corporate allies and not with regard to other allies is beyond me. If the Bill of Rights
had intended an exception to the freedom of speech in order to combat this malign procliv-
ity of the officeholder to agree with those who agree with him, and to speak more with his
supporters than his opponents, it would surely have said so. It did not do so, I think, because
the juice is not worth the squeeze.") The McConnell majority, however, dismissed this argu-
ment by categorizing the use extended economic power of groups for the purposes of
securing access to political decision-makers and thus achieving advantages within interest
group competition as an "appearance of corruption." See supra text accompanying note 51.
See also BeVier, supra note 132, at 1269 (arguing that "commonalties of interest [between
people of similar income] do not necessarily translate into predictable political preferences
that are reliably correlated with income level"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and
Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 663, 680-82 (1997) (explaining that First Amend-
ment protection for symbolic and associative conduct has traditionally protected moneyed
constituencies).
156. See infra note 157.
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isolation is needed only with regard to one (significant) part of the
political agenda.
Let us, however, assume for the purpose of discussion that some
questions are "distributive" in nature (such as, for example, the
level of income tax) while other are "non-distributive" in nature
(such as, for example, abortion) . Should we worry about the in-
fluence of money in politics only in the case of the former and not
in the case of the latter (non-distributive) questions? Should we
object to the excessive influence of the haves on the issue of in-
come tax, but at the same time put up with a given policy only
because its supporters, while not more numerous or more con-
cerned, are richer than its opponents? The answer should be no. If
anything, it makes more sense to conclude that the wealthy have a
particularly important voice on the distributive issue of income tax.
Indeed the idea that those who contribute more wealth to the
community by paying higher taxes, and therefore have "higher
stakes" in politics, should have a "more expansive say" with regard
to the political process has historically been upheld on this
ground.158 Even that long-discarded rationale, however, does not
apply to non-distributive questions. If we are willing to accept that
the haves should not enjoy expanded political power with regard
to distributive questions, then so should we reject any preference
on the basis of economic power for non-distributive questions.
Otherwise, we would take seriously the notion that the opinion of
Exxon Corp. on abortion is 1.8 times more important than the po-
sition of Mobile Corp. on the same issue.'59
157. This is of course not to say that disparities in wealth bear no influence on these is-
sues. In fact, the reverse is true. For example, economic disparities may have clear influence
on the ability of women to have access to abortion. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977) (stating that the inability of indigent women to obtain abortions was a consequence
of their poverty and not of governmental action); Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding
Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 330, 335-36 (1985) (arguing that poor women are, in fact, unable to effectuate their
privacy rights in the context of abortion).
158. See supra Part III.B and text accompanying note 77.
159. Cf FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 258 (Brennan,J., plural-
ity opinion) ("[T]he resources in the treasury of business corporations ... are not an
indication of popular support for corporation's political ideas."); Austin v. Michigan Cham-
ber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (sustaining state prohibition on the use of corporate
treasury funds to make independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to candi-
dates in elections for state office, though not denying First Amendment protections to
corporate speech); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free,
83 IowA L. REv. 995, 1001 (1998) (arguing that corporate speech implicates no First
Amendment values); Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and
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It should be noted that nothing in the argument presented in
this article denies or contrasts the value of group advocacy in plu-
ralist democracy. All I argue is that relative economic gaps should
have no influence on the political debate (at least as it is mani-
fested in the structured arena of political campaigns-the focus of
the current analysis) . le Indeed, the requirement for political equal-
ity focuses primarily on equal procedural conditions and cannot
encompass equality in the results of the political process. Different
groups may acquire more or less political influence with regard to
given political struggles or settings.16' This political competition,
however, should take place within the political sphere, under the
norm of political equality, and with strict separation between the
political and economic spheres. Otherwise, we will observe the sub-
jection of the political process to the inequalities of the market
contrary to the fundamental principles of liberal democracy.1
62
Corporate Speech, 90 YALE L. J. 1833, 1856 (1981) (arguing that corporate speech does not
serve speech interests).
160. The requirement for isolation of the political debate from the influence of eco-
nomic disparities has implications beyond the issue of campaign finance. See infra Part V.C
and text accompanying note 173.
161. In fact, the very claim for equalizing political influence of various groups or indi-
viduals in politics raises not only serious practical difficulties, but also involves serious moral
objections. See Ronald Dworkin, Political Equality, in SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 64, at
184, 194-98 (arguing that accepting equality of influence as an ideal would conflict with
other egalitarian principles). This, however, does not weaken the validity of the claim that
disparities of wealth should not be allowed to convert into political disparities. See id. at 193.
It should also be noted that there is a principal difference between economic and political
power in liberal democracy. Political power-while it may be accumulated and held by spe-
cific individuals and groups at a given point of time-is always subject to reallocation (by
elections, change in the composition of current coalitions, and so forth). Not so economic
power, which is manifested by the institute of private property, and is not subject to the con-
stant possibility of being completely reshuffled within a fixed period of time.
162. An additional argument raised against the call for equality in campaign finance is
that money is a legitimate and even preferred vehicle of reflecting political views and sup-
port of candidates since-unlike regular political votes-it allows members of society not
only to reflect their political preferences but also to manifest the intensity of such prefer-
ences. See Strauss, supra note 52, at 1374. Indeed, money is a sophisticated tool for reflecting
consumer's preferences. This, however, does not answer the egalitarian objection in regard
to the illegitimacy of the influence of market disparities on the political process. Indeed, if
the ultimate concern of the opponents of campaign finance reform is the level of accuracy
of voters' preferences, this can be achieved by a variety of methods that will preserve the
principle of equality. For example, voters can be given a stock of votes (or voting "points")
which they will be entitled to divide between different candidates or options according to
the intensity of their preferences. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 134-35 (Cam-
bridge, 1989). Alternatively, voters can be given campaign finance "vouchers" which they
would be entitled to allocate between various different candidates as the sole means of cam-
paign contribution and so forth. See Foley, supra note 114; Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the
Voters: A New Beginningfor Campaign Finance, 13 Am. PROSPECT 71, 78-79 (1993).
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B. Campaign Money and Freedom of Speech
Should the argument that political money is "speech" within the
meaning of the First Amendment change our conclusions regard-
ing the role of the judiciary in the campaign finance field? 1 3 I
believe that the answer to this question, too, should be in the nega-
tive. Rather than answering the question by concentrating on some
interpretative analysis of the words of the Constitution, we should
focus on the place of the First Amendment itself within the general
constitutional framework of liberal democracy.1 6 4 Even if campaign
money can be regarded as political speech, it is illegitimate to allow
the free use of it.
165
Even in the face of the First Amendment, there are sufficiently
strong reasons for comprehensive regulation of campaign finance.
They are embedded in the basic structure of our social polity and
closely intertwined with the very justification for our existing social
arrangements.1 6  They are based on the need to preserve the
viability of the democratic system from the harmful influences of
163. As argued earlier, the status of campaign dollars as First Amendment speech was
somewhat relegated in McConnell and the threshold requirements for justifying the regula-
tion of such speech were significantly lowered. See supra Part II.B.2 and text accompanying
note 53. Still, the Supreme Court discusses campaign finance regulation under the general
framework of First Amendment speech.
164. See e.g., Federal Election Comm. v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 508 (1985) (White,J., dissenting) ("[Tihe First Amendment protects the right
to speak, not the right to spend, and limitations on the amount of money that can be spent
are not the same as restrictions on speaking."); TRIBE, supra note 82, at 1134-36 (arguing
that the Court's analysis of money as speech in Buckley is at odds with previous decisions
regarding speech-related conduct); Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics) 632-33, supra
note 24 (criticizing the Court's analysis as distorting First Amendment values); Owen M. Fiss,
Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. Riv. 2470, 2480 (1997) (arguing that the Court's analysis
ignores the fact that limits on expenditures may further the First Amendment value of en-
hancing the information of the electorate rather than infringe on it); Schauer, supra note
116, at 1332 (arguing that First Amendment values do not justify the analogy between
money and speech).
165. It is noteworthy that even in Buckley, the Court acknowledged legitimate reasons
(i.e., valid grounds under the rationale of preventing quid pro quo corruption) to regulate
campaign finance "speech." See supra text accompanying note 17. Those grounds were fur-
ther extended in McConnell. See supra text accompanying note 53. For a position that strictly
opposes any regulation of campaign finance even in the context of campaign contribution,
see Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("[C]ontributions to political campaigns generate essential political speech. And contribu-
tion caps, which place a direct and substantial limit on core speech, should be met with the
utmost skepticism and should receive the strictest scrutiny."); McConnell at 737 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Buckley should be overturned on this ground).
166. See infra Part III.C.
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market disparities to sustain the moral justification for liberal de-
mocracy.
In order to answer questions regarding the legitimacy of regulat-
ing speech, we cannot look only to the talismanic verbal formulas
of the phrase ".. . or abridging the freedom of speech." Rather, we
must examine these words within the context of the broader con-
stitutional principles.1 6 1 We must look for the rationale underlying
the First Amendment. There is hardly a question about the central-
ity of the principle of political equality in our system. The link
between this principle and the underlying justification for the po-
litical order in liberal democracy is also established."8 If the moral
justification for economic disparity in liberal democracy is based
on the possibility of correcting such disparities via the political
process, regulating political speech to ensure the vitality and fair-
ness of the political process advances rather than violates the
rationales underlying the First Amendment.'
6
9
More generally, the concept of "political liberty" in liberal de-
mocratic theory can hardly be dealt with in isolation from the
concept of political equality. 70 Nor can haves be allowed to use
their greater economic power to improve their access to the means
of transformation of political speech, since this would inevitably
entail the curtailment of the means of communication held by the
have-nots. In the political sphere of liberal democracy, liberties
must be equal, or else they do not exist at all.' 7' We must therefore
167. See Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics, at 632-33, supra note 24 (criticizing
the Buckley Court for misappropriating "the talismans of our first amendment"); Cass R.
Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 255, 262 (arguing that the First Amendment is
best understood by reference to the democratic process).
168. See supra Part III.A and text accompanying note 59.
169. Cf Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics, at 636, supra note 24 ("None of the ra-
tionales for strong protection of free expression-truth, autonomy and self-fulfillment,
social stability, or self-government-justifies the continuing and unchecked abuses that ex-
cessive spending has brought to the electoral process.").
170. See Shockley, supra note 11, at 700 ("The [Buckley] Court is saying simultaneously
that free speech is not free, and that some should apparently have more free speech than
others.").
171. There is an important distinction in this respect between the need to ensure the
equality of political liberties of all members of the liberal polity and the acknowledgment
that the worth or the usefulness of liberties cannot be the same for everyone. These distinc-
tions involves complex questions in political philosophy. See RAWLS, supra note 24, at 324-
31 (discussing the meaning of worth in liberties and arguing that each citizen must have a
"fair value" of political liberties). In view of the strict requirement for political equality in
the electoral field I do not need to discuss this distinction in regard to the campaign finance




ensure that economic disparities, in the form of campaign dollars,
will not interfere with or distort the political process.
C. The Distinction between Campaign Finance
and Other Political Liberties
The preceding parts of this Article argued that the principles of
liberal democracy require separating the political distributive
process from the market disparities. This claim may, however, raise
the following objection: If the political process should be isolated
from market disparities in the name of political equality this ap-
plies to any part of the political sphere, not just campaign finance.
If political speech should be equalized by preventing economic
forces from interfering with political equality, this applies not only
to the electoral process, but also to other areas such as the control
of mass media, the organization of political action groups, and so
172
on.
Should we, in the name of political equality, object to corporate
ownership of mass media, or of the ability of corporations and
wealthy persons to financially support various interest groups? And
if so, can we regulate these areas accordingly in a way that would be
compatible with First Amendment values?
Admittedly, the argument for the isolation of the political proc-
ess from market disparities under the idea of democratic
partnership carries potential implications for other political activi-
ties. Indeed, the application of this theory to other fields of
172. See, e.g., Joel M. Gora, Book Review: "No Law... Abridging", 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. L.
POL'Y 841, 886 (2001) ("Another problem with these theories [of equalizing campaign
speech] is that the government mechanism would have to be all encompassing, equalizing,
or enhancing, not only of speech by candidates and parties, but of by issue organizations
and the media as well."). A similar objection was raised by the dissent in McConnell with re-
gard to the distinction made in BCRA between corporations in general and media
corporations. See BCRA § 304(f)(3)(B)(i) (amending FECA 2 U.S.C.S. § 434(f)(3)(B)(i),
which excludes from the definition of "electioneering communications" any communication
appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any
broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party,
political committee, or candidate); McConnel 124 S.Ct. at 780 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's reasoning for regulating campaign dollars applies equally to news-
paper editorials and political talk shows); McConnel 124 S.Ct. at 740-41 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the distinction sustained by the Court between media companies
and other corporations will result in "outright regulation of the press"). Cf McConnell, 124 S.
Ct. at 697 (sustaining the media corporations exemption as a "narrow exception [which] is
wholly consistent with First Amendment principles").
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political activities may involve complicated constitutional ques-
tions. 1 3 This, however, should not stop us from acknowledging the
need to apply the argument to the campaign finance field for the
following reasons: First, the interests supporting the regulations of
speech in the campaign finance field are much more intensive and
compelling than in other fields of political expression. Second, the
reasons against the regulation of such (campaign finance)
"speech" are much weaker than in other fields and the complexi-
ties involved are much less troubling. Third, it is possible to
effectively draw the lines between the field of campaign finance
and other fields of political expression, so there is no real danger
that concrete regulation of the field of campaign finance would
seriously infringe on speech rights other than in this specific con-
text. In order to illustrate the first two points let us take the
following example that compares the following two situations. As-
sume that in a given polity there is a debate about the proper
standards of air pollution in regard to polluting sources that oper-
ate in poor residential neighborhoods. A group of wealthy
businesspersons seeks to influence the position of elected legisla-
tors in favor of lenient regulation. The businesspersons can choose
the following strategies: invest large sums of money in placing ads
in the media in support of their position, or threaten the incum-
bent legislators that they will stop supporting their campaigns (and
make their money available to their opponents) in the upcoming
elections. 174 How do these strategies compare in terms of their ef-
fects onpolitical equality and freedom of expression?
First, the expressive value of the campaign finance dollars is lim-
ited, and in any case it is less than the expressive value of the
political ads. 175 The campaign finance strategy seems to harm
173. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 52 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996)
("A privately owned press ... is constrained by the economic structure within which it is
embedded... The market, bearing down on the press, may cause it to be shy in its criticism
of the government or of certain candidates for office .... "); SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 55-
58 (arguing that the current system of free market communication is incompatible with First
Amendment values). See also Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Mur-
doch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1627 (1999) (arguing that the current corporate structure of
the mass media justifies that their campaign speech be restricted as any other commercial
corporation). See also infra note 186.
174. For the purpose of the discussion of this hypothetical case it is immaterial whether
the strategy to support (or avoid) supporting political candidates refers to campaign financ-
ing through direct contributions or through some other strategies of "issue advocacy." See
supra text accompanying notes 22 and 44. Although, the use of such strategies may raise the
question of the distinction between campaign speech and other forms of expression.
175. See Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics, supra note 24 at 1007 (arguing that
money in political campaigns serves as nothing more than a vehicle for political expression
1010 [VOL. 37:4
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political equality more severely than the ads do. The ads may gen-
erate some public pressure on the legislators in favor of lenient
regulations. Such pressure, while not negligible, can be offset or
relieved by various means, including political demonstrations or
lobbying activity on the part of environmental groups. Their ex-
pected influence on the legislators is, in any case, limited. After all,
the legislators (or at least some of them) have large constituencies
in the polluted neighborhoods. The impact of the threat to cut
campaign financing (if credible), on the other hand, is likely to be
immediate and decisive. Assuming that in this given polity large
sums of money are an essential condition for election campaign,
and those sums are based on private sources, the threat leaves the
legislators with very little choice. Therefore, even if we accept that
campaign dollars are a legitimate form of political speech, it is ob-
vious that the magnitude of their influence-that is the extent to
which they tip the political balance of power in favor of the
wealthy-is much greater than the political ads in the media. Thus,
while the expressive value of campaign dollars is dubious, the harm
that they cause to political equality is enormous.
In addition to the quantitative difference between campaign
dollars and other forms of political speech, there is also an impor-
tant categorical difference regarding the way in which these two
forms of speech operate. Arguably, the political ads may be re-
garded as part of the legitimate public debate in the course of the
process of democratic deliberation concerning the question of en-
vironmental legislation. While the public campaign in the media is
aimed to convince the legislators to support lenient regulation (and
to generate pressure on them, by using the democratic mechanism
of gaining public support), the campaign finance threat provides
the corporations with a powerful leverage that largely saves them the
need to convince the general public of the soundness of their argument.
Thus, the campaign finance thereat enables the wealthy to circum-
vent the process of democratic deliberation. Rather than
and therefore "[rlestrictions on the use of money should be judged by the tests employed
for vehicles-for speech-related conduct-and not by the test developed for pure speech");
TRIBE, supra note 82, at 1134-35 (echoing Wright's critique on the speech-conduct analysis
of Buckley). Doubts in regard to the expressive value of such a form of "speech" may serve as
an explanation for the Court's willingness to sustain the constitutionality of contribution
limits on corporate speech. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 664
(discussing political "corruption" as relating to "the corrosive and distorting effects of im-
mense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and
that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas"). See also infra Part II.B.2 and text accompanying note 53.
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functioning as part of the public debate, the campaign finance
threat serves as a vehicle that appeals to legislators' self-interest in
being re-elected.
To sum up this point, campaign finance speech differs from
other forms of speech: the interests of regulating it in the name of
equality are much more pressing and compelling than in other
cases of political speech, while the implications of regulating cam-
paign finance on the values of free speech are likely to be much
more limited than in other areas in which economic disparities
influence the political realm. It is one thing to hold that business-
persons (or wealthy persons in general) should be restricted when
it comes to investing money in electoral campaigns. It is wholly dif-
ferent to argue against private ownership of the media, or against
the right of people to donate their money to support controversial
activities. While in both cases the involvement of market disparities
in the political field raises serious questions regarding political
equality, the implications of such restrictions in regard to cam-
paign finance are much more confined, and much less
problematic from the point of view of political freedoms. 176
This brings us to the last point, which is the feasibility of an ef-
fective and practical way to distinguish between election-related
speech and other forms of political expression. Elections are part
of a formal, legally structured realm of governmental apparatus.Y
7
1
They take place in distinct locations at particular times; the par-
ticipants in the process are clearly defined. It is therefore possible
176. This point can be supported by looking at the state of affairs in other liberal de-
mocracies. Comprehensive regulations of the campaign finance field are commonplace in
many liberal democracies. Such regulation often includes strict restrictions of campaign
expenditures, and, in some cases, an almost complete abandonment of private funding in
favor of publicly funded systems. See Roland S. Homet, Jr, Fact Finding in First Amendment
Litigation: The Case of Campaign Finance Reform, 21 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 97, 147-48 (1996)
(pointing to the fact that all the large industrial democracies that form the so-called "Group
of 7" except the United States-impose spending limits on political campaigns, as do many
other western democracies such as Belgium, New Zealand, Israel and Spain); Greenwood,
supra note 159, at 995 and n.66 (1998) (reviewing the constitutionality of limits of campaign
expenditures in various democracies). The attitude of other liberal democracies towards
private ownership of the media, for example, is completely different. There is hardly any
liberal democracy in which the regulation of the media reflects an objection to the idea that
the print or the electronic media (or at least, substantial parts of it) can legitimately be con-
trolled by business organizations. See, e.g., WOLFGANG HOFFMANN-RIEM, REGULATING MEDIA:
THE LICENSING AND SUPERVISION OF BROADCASTING IN SIX COUNTRIES 160-162 (The Guil-
ford Press 1996) (describing the privatization of mass media in France); id. at 115 (detailing
the decentralization of mass media in Germany after World War II).
177. Baker, supra note 24, at 3 (defining campaign speech as "institutionally bound




to draw the lines between elections and the general marketplace of
ideas on the basis of the temporal nature of the elections and
other distinctive characteristics.1 8  Indeed, this is exactly the
direction taken by Congress in BCRA, which provides for a new
criterion for the regulation of campaign advocacy by referring to
"clearly identified candidates" and made within sixty days before
elections.Y9
Campaign finance-even if viewed as political speech-should
be regarded as part of the electoral process, and it can be distin-
guished from other forms of political speech. As we have seen, the
Court has acknowledged the centrality of the value of political
equality and has applied extensive requirements in elections.1s0
Since the reasons for adopting the same conception of equality for
campaign finance are just as compelling as they are for other com-
ponents of the electoral process, and since the risks posed to non-
electoral political speech by regulating campaign finance can be
effectively managed, political equality should serve as a central
value in regulating campaign finance. 8"
There are various ways to achieve political equality in the field of
campaign finance: by adopting comprehensive schemes of public
funding;8 2 by imposing a ceiling on both campaign contributions
178. See Briffault, Issue Advocacy, supra note 22, at 1782-87 (suggesting that campaign fi-
nance regulations should regulate speech in a fix period prior to the date of election, and
refer to speech as electoral speech if it refers to a clearly identified candidate or group of
candidates).
179. See BCRA § 201 (a), supra note 37. This provision of BCRA was upheld by the Court
in McConneIL See 124 S. Ct. at 689. The Court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
definition of 'electioneering communication' in BCRA is tainted by vagueness. Id. at 181
("Finally we observe that new FECA § 304(f) (3)'s definition of 'electioneering communica-
tion' raises none of the vagueness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley. The term
"electioneering communication" applies only (1) to a broadcast, (2) clearly identifying a
candidate for federal office, (3) aired within a specific time period, and (4) targeted to an
identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners. These components are both easily
understood and objectively determinable.").
180. See supra Part III.B and text accompanying notes 75 and 125. See also Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer & Ginsburg, 1J., concurring)
(pointing to the needed link between the Court'sjurisprudence on campaign finance and
the and its extended requirements in the field of electoral equality).
181. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amend-
ment, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1803, 1835 (1999) ("[J]ustifying ... special domain [for electoral
speech] seems ... a less daunting task ... First Amendment doctrine is not a monolith to
which the separate treatment of electoral speech would be a dangerous exception.").
182. A comprehensive public funding scheme is probably the most appealing strategy
for those who wish to achieve an egalitarian system of campaign finance. See Raskin & Boni-
faz, supra note 11, at 1189 (advocating public financing as the preferred way to achieve
electoral equality). Such comprehensive schemes of campaign finance exist in many liberal
democracies. See HERBERT ALEXANDER & REi SHIRATORI, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL FINANCE
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and expenditures; 8 " by subsidizing campaign speech of the least
advantaged in the form of "voting dollars,"8 4 "campaign scholar-
ships,'' 15 or requiring broadcast licensees to reserve of a fixed
amount of time for campaign speech.86 All these solutions are
among the suggestions raised in the literature, and many of them
have equivalents in other liberal democracies. 187 The adoption of
each of these solutions or any combination of solutions would re-
quire an elaborate regulatory structure and a comprehensive
analysis that is beyond the scope and purpose of the current dis-
cussion. Rather, my purpose is to demonstrate that the
AMONG DEMOCRACIES, 29-40, 97-131 (1994) (collecting essays reviewing public funding
systems in Australia, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands). The Supreme Court in Buckley
sustained the constitutionality of the public funding schemes in FECA regarding presiden-
tial campaigns. See Buckley at 92-95. It also held that public funding can be constitutionally
conditioned by restrictions on spending by candidates who choose to apply for it. Since,
however, public funding schemes are closely intertwined with spending limitations, the abil-
ity of public funding schemes based on voluntary, rather than compulsory spending limits,
to ensure political equality is partial. See Briffault, Public Funding, supra note 22, at 568 (ex-
pressing concerns regarding the efficacy of public funding as long as ample private sources
exist at the disposal of political candidates); see also supra note 56.
183. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
184. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 95, at 14-25 (proposing a system of "voting dol-
lars" under which each citizen would be granted an equal fixed sum of non-transferable
electoral dollars that she would be allowed to contribute to candidates in elections, and
arguing that such a system would foster political deliberation and combine political equality
with market flexibility); Foley, supra note 114, at 1253-56 (discussing the various aspects of
such solution). ACKERMAN & AYRES do not argue for a total ban on private contribution, but
rather for a mixed system combining voting dollars with a system of private contributions.
See id. at 35-38. For additional proposals for similar plans, see Briffault, Public Funding, supra
note 22, at 566 n. 11.
185. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 11, at 1194 (proposing campaign scholarships for
low-income candidates).
186. Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First Amendment, 77 TEx L. REv. 1837
(1999) (arguing that such a solution would be "simple and efficient" and would raise little
First Amendment questions); Raskin & Bonifaz id. at 1195 (proposing that broadcasters'
license will contain conditions regarding the provision of free air time to cover candidate
debates and free media time available to candidates qualifying for public financing). See also
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov. PAC, 528 U.S. at 404-05 (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring) (re-
ferring to "important proposed reforms as reduced-price media time"). Allocation of free
broadcasting time between political parties and candidates during election is practiced in
various countries. See, e.g., The West German Media Case, 14 BVerfGE 121 (1962), translated in
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
215-17 (2nd ed., 1997)(Germany); ERIC BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 174, 180 (1993) (France and Italy).
187. For additional proposals aimed at enhancing political equality in the campaign fi-
nance area, see Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity
to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REv. 837 (1998) (creating institutions
that would assure the anonymity of all campaign contributions); Kenneth N. Weine, Prospec-
tive: Tiggering the First Amendment: Why Campaign Finance Systems That Include "Triggers" are
Constitutional, 24J. LEGiS. 223 (1998) (providing public funding to candidates who voluntar-
ily limit their campaign spending).
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fundamental principles of liberal democracy justify the adoption of
such a course of action in the name of political equality.
VI. CONCLUSION
The moral justification for the current regime of liberal democ-
racy is the possibility of redistribing economic goods through the
political process under conditions of political equality. This vision
of democratic partnership enables us to enjoy the prosperity of
competitive markets and morally justify the existing social condi-
tions for each and every member of the political community.
Under democratic partnership not everyone enjoys a similar piece
of the economic pie, but everyone is an equal partner in determin-
ing how to divide this pie.
This implies an important role for the judiciary in campaign fi-
nance. The relationships between market and politics are part of
the fundamental framework of the social order in liberal democ-
racy. As such, they should be the subject matter of constitutional
analysis. While courts are not expected to be the initial decision-
makers with regard to distributive questions, they carry the para-
mount responsibility of ensuring that the process of redistribution
occurs under conditions of equality. In particular, it is the duty of
the courts to ensure that market disparities do not distort the fun-
damental principle of equality in elections.
This vision of democratic partnership is compatible with the
constitutional doctrines espoused by the Supreme Court during
the second part of the 20th century, most notably the exclusion of
economic barriers as preconditions to electoral participation. In
McConnell v. FEC the Court has finally revealed a willingness to
conduct a comprehensive reconsideration of its current campaign
finance doctrine. The new constitutional doctrine should acknowl-
edge the centrality of political equality with regard to campaign
finance regulation. It should ensure that the political process is
open to all members of society and that the influence of disparities
of wealth on this process with regard to the crucial stage of elec-
tions would be minimized.
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